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TRANSPARENCY AND  
ALGORITHMIC GOVERNANCE 
CARY COGLIANESE* & DAVID LEHR** 
Machine-learning algorithms are improving and automating important functions in med-
icine, transportation, and business.  Government officials have also started to take notice of 
the accuracy and speed that such algorithms provide, increasingly relying on them to aid 
with consequential public-sector functions, including tax administration, regulatory over-
sight, and benefits administration.  Despite machine-learning algorithms’ superior predictive 
power over conventional analytic tools, algorithmic forecasts are difficult to understand and 
explain.  Machine learning’s “black box” nature has thus raised concern: Can algorithmic 
governance be squared with legal principles of governmental transparency?  We analyze this 
question and conclude that machine-learning algorithms’ relative inscrutability does not pose 
a legal barrier to their responsible use by governmental authorities.  We distinguish between 
principles of “fishbowl transparency” and “reasoned transparency,” explaining how both 
are implicated by algorithmic governance but also showing that neither conception compels 
anything close to total transparency.  Although machine learning’s black-box features dis-
tinctively implicate notions of reasoned transparency, legal demands for reason-giving can 
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be satisfied by explaining an algorithm’s purpose, design, and basic functioning.  Further-
more, new technical advances will only make machine-learning algorithms increasingly more 
explainable.  Algorithmic governance can meet both legal and public demands for transpar-
ency while still enhancing accuracy, efficiency, and even potentially legitimacy in govern-
ment.  
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INTRODUCTION 
When Abraham Lincoln declared in 1863 that government “of the people, 
by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth,”1 he spoke to 
enduring values of liberty and democracy.  Today, these values appear to 
face an emerging threat from technology.  Specifically, advances in machine-
learning technology—or artificial intelligence2—portend a future in which 
 
1. President Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863). 
2. By “artificial intelligence” and “machine learning,” we refer in this Article to a broad 
approach to predictive analytics captured under various umbrella terms, including “big data 
analytics,” “deep learning,” “reinforcement learning,” “smart machines,” “neural networks,” 
“natural language processing,” and “learning algorithms.”  For our purposes, we need not 
parse differences in the meaning of these terms, nor will we delve deeply into specific tech-
niques within machine learning.  It is sufficient to note that “[m]achine learning is not a mon-
olith.”  David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn 
 
COGLIANESE & LEHR_ME REVIEW FINAL-CC.DOCX(DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/19  7:46 PM 
2019] TRANSPARENCY & ALGORITHMIC GOVERNANCE 3 
many governmental decisions will no longer be made by people, but by com-
puter-processed algorithms.  What such a future will mean for liberty and 
democracy will depend to a significant degree on the extent to which these 
algorithms and their functioning can be made transparent to the public. 
The government’s use of machine-learning algorithms will follow from the 
great strides these algorithms have made in the private sector, where they are 
improving and automating important decisions, such as those in diagnosing 
medical conditions, operating motor vehicles, and detecting credit card 
fraud.3  Public-sector institutions have started to take note.  At both local and 
national levels, governments are beginning to rely on machine-learning al-
gorithms to aid consequential decisionmaking.4  Scholars and policy officials 
alike see increasing promise for the use of machine-learning algorithms by 
administrative agencies in a range of domestic policy areas.5  Indeed, loom-
 
About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 669 (2017).  Part I of the present Article 
provides a brief discussion of the basic properties of the computational tools we have in mind. 
3. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER STEINER, AUTOMATE THIS: HOW ALGORITHMS CAME TO 
RULE OUR WORLD 4–7 (2012) (providing examples of how algorithms have “displaced hu-
mans in a growing number of industries”); Darrell M. West & John R. Allen, How Artificial 
Intelligence Is Transforming the World, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Apr. 24, 2018), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-artificial-intelligence-is-transforming-the-world/ 
(“There are numerous examples where [artificial intelligence (AI)] already is making an im-
pact on the world and augmenting human capabilities in significant ways.”).  See generally EXEC. 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, AUTOMATION, AND THE ECONOMY 
(2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/Arti-
ficial-Intelligence-Automation-Economy.PDF (discussing implications of artificial intelligence 
for the economy). 
4. See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL COMM. ON 
TECH., PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (2016), https://obama 
whitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC/pre 
paring_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf (describing opportunities and challenges associated with the 
use of artificial intelligence in the private and public sectors); P’SHIP FOR PUB. SERV. & IBM 
CTR. FOR THE BUS. OF GOV’T, THE FUTURE HAS BEGUN: USING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
TO TRANSFORM GOVERNMENT (2018), http://www.businessofgovernment.org/report/us-
ing-artificial-intelligence-transform-government [hereinafter IBM CTR., THE FUTURE HAS 
BEGUN] (presenting case studies of government agencies’ use of artificial intelligence). 
5. See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL COMM. ON 
TECH., supra note 4, at 1 (observing that “[t]he effectiveness of government itself is being in-
creased as agencies build their capacity to use AI to carry out their missions more quickly, 
responsively, and efficiently”); STEPHEN GOLDSMITH & SUSAN CRAWFORD, THE RESPONSIVE 
CITY: ENGAGING COMMUNITIES THROUGH DATA-SMART GOVERNANCE 107–08 (2014) (dis-
cussing the use of machine learning and other data intensive strategies at the local level of 
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ing just over the horizon, agencies could soon develop systems that use algo-
rithms to make key decisions automatically, raising the increasingly realistic 
prospect of robotically created regulations and algorithmically resolved ad-
judications. 
Existing and future applications of machine learning in governmental set-
tings present important new questions about the proper scope for and design 
of algorithmic governance.  One of the most salient questions centers on 
transparency and arises from the relatively inscrutable nature of these new 
techniques.6  Unlike the traditional statistical analysis on which governmen-
tal decisionmakers have long relied—an analysis in which humans specify 
models relating input variables to output variables—machine-learning tech-
niques have a decidedly “black box” character to them.7  This makes it diffi-
cult to understand and put into intuitive prose how learning algorithms reach 
 
government); Joel Tito, Destination Unknown: Exploring the Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Govern-
ment 6 (Sept. 2017) (unpublished working paper) (on file with the Centre for Public Impact), 
https://publicimpact.blob.core.windows.net/production/2017/09/Destination-Unknown-
AI-and-government.pdf (noting that “the impact on governments of AI adoption will be enor-
mous”). 
6. See, e.g., VIKTOR MAYER-SHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A 
REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 179 (2013) (point-
ing to “the risk that big-data predictions, and the algorithms and datasets behind them, will 
become black boxes that offer us no accountability, traceability, or confidence”); FRANK 
PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY 
AND INFORMATION 8 (2015) (raising alarm over “authority increasingly expressed algorithmi-
cally” because “[t]he values and prerogatives that the encoded rules enact are hidden within 
black boxes”); Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 
1254 n.23 (2008) (decrying the “opacity of automated systems” and recommending steps for 
agencies to take to ensure they provide “meaningful notice”); Karen Yeung, Algorithmic Regu-
lation: A Critical Interrogation, REG. & GOVERNANCE 12–13 (2017), https://onlineli-
brary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/rego.12158 (arguing that, because they are “opaque, in-
scrutable ‘black boxes,’” algorithms present a fundamental challenge to the aspiration of a 
“liberal society . . . to be a transparent order”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
7. Michael Luca, Jon Kleinberg & Sendhil Mullainathan, Algorithms Need Managers, Too, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (2016) (“Algorithms are black boxes . . . .  [They] often can predict the fu-
ture with great accuracy but tell you neither what will cause an event nor why.”).  Moreover, 
a government official relying on these advanced analytic techniques to address a public prob-
lem will not obtain from them any clear understanding of what is causing the problem the 
official seeks to solve.  This is because machine-learning algorithms are predictive tools that 
do not directly support the drawing of causal inferences, which means, for the purpose of 
governmental transparency, that a government official will not find from the use of these al-
gorithms a causal reason for adopting a particular policy.  See infra Section I.B. 
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the results they do.8  It may be one thing for private-sector organizations to 
rely on inscrutable algorithms, but governmental decisionmakers have long 
been bound by principles of transparency.9 
Can algorithmic governance be squared with legal demands for transpar-
ency?  In this Article, we consider this question in depth and offer a compre-
hensive assessment of issues of transparency implicated by methods of algo-
rithmic governance.10  We begin in Part I by highlighting current and 
prospective uses for machine learning by governmental entities, explaining 
what makes machine learning different from other types of analysis, and 
drawing a key distinction between machine-learning applications that sup-
port human decisions versus those that substitute for human decisions.  In 
Part II, we articulate the principles of transparency applicable to government 
in the United States to show what current legal standards demand.  We dis-
tinguish between “fishbowl transparency” and “reasoned transparency,”11 
 
8. See, e.g., JUDEA PEARL & DANA MACKENZIE, THE BOOK OF WHY: THE NEW SCIENCE 
OF CAUSE AND EFFECT 359 (2018) (noting that, with machine-learning techniques, “the pro-
grammer has no idea what computations [the algorithm] is performing or why they work”); 
Cliff Kuang, Can AI Be Taught to Explain Itself?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Nov. 21, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/21/magazine/can-ai-be-taught-to-explain-itself.html 
(observing “that artificial intelligences often excel by developing whole new ways of seeing, or 
even thinking, that are inscrutable to us”). 
9. On the rationale for and principles of transparency as applied to governmental entities, 
see Cary Coglianese et al., Transparency and Public Participation in the Federal Rulemaking Process: 
Recommendations for the New Administration, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 924, 926, 961 (2009), and 
Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of Transparency, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 1011 (2008).  With respect to private uses of machine learning, it should be noted that the 
European Union (EU) has imposed transparency-related regulatory obligations on private use 
of personalized data, with liability extending to private entities beyond Europe.  Regulation 
2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection 
of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement 
of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 
2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter EU General Data Protection Regulation].  Although our 
analysis here focuses on the transparency of governmental uses of machine-learning algo-
rithms in the United States, the EU’s so-called right to explanation does bear affinities with 
parts of American administrative law applicable to federal agencies. 
10. In an earlier article, we raised transparency as one of several issues implicated by 
governmental use of machine learning, but we could only provide a brief sketch there of the 
open-government legal issues presented by algorithmic governance.  See Cary Coglianese & 
David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 
GEO. L.J. 1147, 1205–13 (2017).  Our present Article tackles the important issue of transpar-
ency head on, providing the comprehensive legal analysis that our earlier work lacked.  
11. See infra Section II.A (defining and discussing these terms). 
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explaining that both are implicated by, and relevant to, algorithmic govern-
ance—but also noting that under neither conception do current legal stand-
ards demand anything close to total transparency.  In Part III, we assess 
whether machine learning’s ostensibly black-box features will prevent gov-
ernments that use this technology from meeting legal standards of transpar-
ency.  We conclude that, when governments use algorithms responsibly, ma-
chine learning can pass muster under prevailing norms.  Moreover, we point 
to a widening panoply of techniques that data scientists are developing to 
make learning algorithms more explainable.  Overall, we find reason to be 
optimistic that, notwithstanding machine learning’s black-box qualities, re-
sponsible governments can provide sufficient transparency about their use of 
algorithms to supplement, and possibly even replace, human judgments. 
I.  TOWARD A BLACK-BOX GOVERNMENT? 
Private industry has turned to machine learning because it offers unparal-
leled accuracy, surpassing not only other statistical methods but also human 
judgment.12  Today, uses of machine learning abound in the private sector, 
where its ability to make extraordinarily accurate predictions in complex de-
cision spaces has made it integral to consumer recommendation systems, 
marketing campaigns, supply chain optimization, self-driving cars, and much 
more.13  Machine learning’s value derives from its ability to learn for itself 
how to detect useful patterns in massive data sets and put together infor-
mation in ways that yield remarkably accurate predictions or estimations.  
Given these algorithms’ advantages, governmental authorities have many 
opportunities to take advantage of them as well.  In this Part, we survey sev-
eral existing governmental applications and, more strikingly, sketch some 
possibilities for how governmental use of machine learning could develop in 
the future.  We then turn to what makes machine learning distinctive, ex-
plaining briefly how it works and showing why, despite its advantages in de-
livering accuracy, its results can be harder to explain.  
A. Methods of Algorithmic Governance 
When considering governmental use of machine learning, applications 
can be distinguished by the extent to which they are outcome determinative.  
By this we mean the extent to which the output of an algorithm corresponds 
 
12. See Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 10, at 1158 n.40 and accompanying text. 
13. See, e.g., West & Allen, supra note 3.  
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directly to governmental action eventually taken: Does the output of an al-
gorithm directly determine what governmental action is taken?14  An algo-
rithm could be outcome determinative if, either by the design of a govern-
mental procedure or in conjunction with other computer programs, it 
directly initiates an action or makes a decision in a way that effectively leaves 
humans “out of the loop.”15  Alternatively, an algorithm’s output could 
merely be passed along as one factor for consideration by a human official 
who possesses complete control over what action is ultimately taken. 
Today, most governmental applications of machine learning are not de-
terminative of final actions.  For instance, machine-learning algorithms have 
been applied to direct police officers toward potentially high-crime areas, but 
not to determine by themselves whom to arrest.  They have been used by 
local officials to direct restaurant inspectors toward establishments that are 
likely violating food safety standards, but not to impose penalties.16  They 
have been used in similar ways by federal agencies to identify individual tax 
returns for auditing,17 predict toxicities of chemicals that could potentially be 
regulated,18 identify fishing boats to inspect for compliance with by-catch 
 
14. See Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 10, at 1167–76 (discussing how machine learning 
might be used in determining government actions). 
15. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445, 1450–52 
(2013) (applying the related concept of an “algorithm-based decision”).  In using the term “out 
of the loop,” we do not mean to suggest that humans are not involved in the process at all.  
Even with an outcome-determinative system, humans design the system and make the deci-
sion to use it—and can make the decision to discontinue its use.  In other words, machine-
learning algorithms do not possess lives of their own.  See PAUL SCHARRE, ARMY OF NONE: 
AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS AND THE FUTURE OF WAR 30, 32 (2018) (“Fully autonomous sys-
tems sense, decide, and act entirely without human intervention” but “[a]utonomy doesn’t 
mean the system is exhibiting free will or disobeying its programming”).  For an accessible 
discussion of “loop-related” terminology, see id. at 28–32.   
16. See Mohana Ravindranath, In Chicago, Food Inspectors Are Guided by Big Data, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/on-it/in-chicago-food-in-
spectors-are-guided-by-big-data/2014/09/27/96be8c68-44e0-11e4-b47c-f5889e061e5f_ 
story.html.  
17. See JANE MARTIN & RICK STEPHENSON, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., RISK-BASED 
COLLECTION MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING 142–58 (2005), http://www.irs.gov/ 
pub/irs-soi/05stephenson.pdf. 
18. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFFICE OF RESEARCH & DEV., TOXICITY 
FORECASTER (TOXCAST™) (2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-12/ 
documents/tox_cast_fact_sheet_dec2016.pdf; Robert Kavlock et al., Update on EPA’s ToxCast 
Program: Providing High Throughput Decision Support Tools for Chemical Risk Management, 25 
CHEMICAL RES. TOXICOLOGY 1287, 1295 (2012). 
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rules,19 discern patterns in vaccine adverse-event reports,20 and assist in con-
ducting quality control reviews of Social Security disability claims pro-
cessing.21  In all of these instances, humans retain complete say over any final 
governmental action taken.  Furthermore, although these examples involve 
rather consequential decisions and policies, machine learning has also been 
applied to automate a host of more routine tasks that are less salient, such as 
sorting mail22 and sifting through survey responses about workplace inju-
ries.23 
But this currently limited nature of machine learning will not last long.  
With the advancement of machine-learning techniques and the proliferation 
of supporting back-end data infrastructures,24 the role for algorithms in gov-
ernment is likely to expand.25  Not only could machine learning soon be em-
ployed in more determinative ways, but it could do so, broadly speaking, to 
yield two different kinds of determinations: adjudications and regulations. 
For adjudication by algorithm, no longer might algorithms merely inform 
adjudicatory decisions, such as by targeting inspectors to certain facilities or 
flagging tax returns for a full review by human auditors.  Rather, machine 
learning, in conjunction with other computer systems, might directly and au-
tomatically conduct an audit or inspection, deem a tax return fraudulent, 
 
19. Richard Berk, Forecasting Consumer Safety Violations and Violators, in IMPORT SAFETY: 
REGULATORY GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 131, 136 (Cary Coglianese et al. eds., 
2009) 
20. See HESHA J. DUGGIRALA ET AL., DATA MINING AT FDA (2015), 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/ScienceResearch/DataMiningatFDA/UCM443675.pdf; 
Taxiarchis Botsis et al., Novel Algorithms for Improved Pattern Recognition Using the US FDA Adverse 
Event Network Analyzer, 205 STUDENT HEALTH TECH. INFO. 1178–82 (2014). 
21. FELIX F. BAJANDAS & GERALD K. RAY, IMPLEMENTATION AND USE OF ELECTRONIC 
CASE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS IN FEDERAL AGENCY ADJUDICATION 49–51 (May 23, 2018), 
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2018.05.23%20eCMS%20Final%20 
report_2.pdf. 
22. See Ofer Matan et al., Handwritten Character Recognition Using Neural Network 
Architectures (Nov. 1990) (unpublished paper presented at Proceedings of the 4th USPS Ad-
vanced Technology Conference), http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/publis/pdf/matan-90.pdf. 
23. See IBM CTR., THE FUTURE HAS BEGUN, supra note 4, at 17. 
24. By “back-end infrastructures,” we mean to refer to various computing capabilities 
often needed to make machine learning operational.  This includes sufficient data storage 
needed to support the use of the large data sets on which machine learning operates best.  
Furthermore, the deployment of machine-learning algorithms—putting them into practice 
and allowing them to, say, dictate what adjudicatory action is taken—requires developing 
ancillary computer programs that turn a machine-learning prediction into an action.  See Lehr 
& Ohm, supra note 2, at 701 n.173 and accompanying text.  
25. See Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 10, at 1167–76. 
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decide whether an individual should receive an airplane pilot’s license, award 
or withhold disability benefits, or assign prisoners to cells based on predic-
tions of their propensity for future violence.26  It takes little technical imagi-
nation to see how these applications could materialize; they would be rela-
tively straightforward applications of machine learning.  As suggested by 
existing private-sector uses of machine learning, the quintessential tasks to 
which learning algorithms customarily apply are individual-level predic-
tions—such as whether a consumer will buy a product, whether an email is 
spam, and so forth.  Adjudicating by algorithm relies on the same kind of 
predictions—whether a worksite has a safety violation, whether a tax return 
is fraudulent, or whether an individual meets benefits eligibility criteria.  To 
be sure, employing machine learning in a way that fully determines adjudi-
catory outcomes will require significant technical investments in back-end 
data infrastructures.  But at base, the statistical tools that will facilitate adju-
dicating by algorithm already exist and are already being employed in anal-
ogous endeavors.27 
A bit more technical imagination and advancement may be required for 
machine learning to usher in automatic regulation—that is, the making of 
rules by robot.  In part this is because what automated rules mean might take 
several different forms.  Perhaps the simplest form would be a regulatory au-
thority mandating the use of a particular machine-learning system in lieu of 
stating a rule in canonical text.28  In other words, the regulator would man-
date the use of algorithmic adjudication, with the algorithm constituting the 
 
26. See, e.g., BAJANDAS & RAY, supra note 21, at 7 (noting that although currently the So-
cial Security Administration uses an algorithmic system to support quality checks on how dis-
ability claims are handled by humans, “eventually deep learning algorithms may be able to 
process some claims to final resolution”).  
27. For a discussion of a successful private-sector analogue—the fully automated dispute 
resolution system developed and already used by eBay to settle tens of millions of disputes 
each year—see Colin Rule, Resolving Disputes in the World’s Largest Marketplace, ACRESOLUTION, 
Fall 2018, at 8–11 (2008) and BENJAMIN H. BARTON & STEPHANOS BIBAS, REBOOTING 
JUSTICE: MORE TECHNOLOGY, FEWER LAWYERS, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW 111–15 (2017).  
In June 2018, the Administrative Conference of the United States adopted a recommendation 
that agencies that have electronic case records “should consider how to analyze and leverage” 
these sources of data “to improve their adjudicative processes, including through the use of 
natural language processing, machine learning, and predictive algorithms.”  Admin. Conf. of 
the U.S., Recommendation 2018-3, Electronic Case Management in Federal Administrative Adjudica-
tion, 83 Fed. Reg. 30,686, 30,687 (June 29, 2018). 
28. Cf. Cary Coglianese, E-Rulemaking: Information Technology and the Regulatory Process, 56 
ADMIN. L. REV. 353, 370–71 (2004) (describing how information technology might “trans-
form[] rules from text contained in the Code of Federal Regulations to software packages akin to 
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applicable rule according to which adjudications should be made.  For ex-
ample, consider an illustrative case of an individual applying for a govern-
mental license—say, a prospective pilot asking the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration (FAA) to grant her flight certification.  Currently, the FAA has 
established a set of fixed rules for when a commercial pilot certificate can be 
awarded.29  The rules specify requirements for age, hours of flight training 
and experience, and performance on written and in-flight tests.30  These rules 
may work well, but it is not beyond the imagination to think that one day the 
FAA might instead rely on a machine-learning algorithm to improve the pro-
cess of determining when a pilot’s license should be granted.  Under such an 
algorithmic government model, the “rule” would be the algorithm.  The ap-
plication for a license to be issued under the rule might comprise the signing 
of a consent form to allow the FAA to run its authorized algorithm through 
all of the available data about the applicant—say, school records, medical 
records, social media postings, and fine-grained data from the flight record-
ers from previous training flights flown by the applicant.  The FAA could 
award a pilot’s license when the machine-learning algorithm forecasts the 
applicant’s risk to be below a specified threshold. 
In such a case of mandatory algorithmic adjudication, with the algorithm 
substituting for the rule, humans would still be instrumental in designing that 
algorithm and specifying the level at which forecasted risk would deny a li-
cense to an applicant.  Humans could also conceivably go further to design 
systems that would not merely substitute for rules but that could actually craft 
or select rules.  Such fully automated rulemaking would contemplate remov-
ing humans from the selection of an administrative rule.  Consider, for ex-
ample, whether algorithms might eventually be able to replace the current 
process by which the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) establishes permissible exposure limits (PELs) for chemicals in work-
places.  The process today depends on research and analysis by humans—so 
much so that OSHA cannot realistically establish a PEL for every chemical 
to which workers might be exposed.  If chemicals’ health risks could be fore-
casted by the use of a machine-learning algorithm, perhaps OSHA in the 
future could create an algorithmic system that would automatically establish 
PELs. 
Automated rulemaking will be a more challenging scenario to realize. As 
with an adjudication, the relevant questions to be answered in a rulemaking 
go beyond the information processing needed to make an individualized 
 
the popular TurboTaxÒ or other commercially available compliance software”). 
29. See Certification: Pilots, Flights Instructors, and Ground Instructors, 14 C.F.R. § 61 
(2018). 
30. Id. 
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forecast.  Unlike adjudicating, however, regulating typically does not rely on 
simple factual predicates of the kind long predicted by machine learning.  For 
one, making a rule fundamentally demands identifying relevant normative 
values or policy goals—e.g., how safe is safe enough?—and these value 
choices will be ones that humans must make and then use to inform the pa-
rameters specified in an algorithm’s objective function.31  Even with respect 
to the factual forecasts that algorithms can make to inform rulemaking deci-
sions, almost any major rulemaking will be multi-faceted, with tradeoffs to 
be made across multiple factual outcomes.  Resolving such tradeoffs will be 
another choice calling for human judgment.  For example, even a rule as 
seemingly straightforward as a PEL cannot be accomplished by a single al-
gorithm predicting, say, how many cases of a specific disease would occur if 
a very specific amount of that pollutant were released.  Setting a workplace 
chemical exposure standard demands understanding the effects that expo-
sure to varying levels of a chemical will have on multiple diseases and other 
consequences, as well as attending to other factors such as the costs of emis-
sions control or the likelihood that regulated entities would comply with dif-
ferent standards.  A single machine-learning algorithm cannot by itself make 
multi-faceted tradeoffs. 
But a machine-learning algorithm can be built into a larger automatic 
rulemaking system where normative choices and tradeoffs have been speci-
fied in advance.  If the policy options can be clearly conceived in advance, 
and if the basis for choosing between them depends simply on a forecast that 
a machine-learning algorithm can make, a system could be designed in which 
the algorithm in essence automatically “chooses” the rule.  Such a possibility 
already exists in an algorithmic system the city of Los Angeles has created to 
operate its traffic signals.32  For any given driver approaching an intersection 
at any given time, the machine-learning system automatically determines the 
“rule” confronting the driver about whether to stop or go.  The rule choices 
in the system are exceedingly simple and well specified: the rule can be “red,” 
“yellow,” or “green.”  The value choice reflected in the algorithm’s objective 
 
31. For a discussion of the inherent normativity involved in setting regulatory standards, 
see Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of Science in Setting Risk 
Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1262, 1277 (2004).  In suggesting that normative choices 
necessarily underlie rulemaking, we certainly do not mean to suggest that such choices have 
no bearing on adjudication.  With adjudication, however, a learning algorithm’s objective 
function is based on underlying rules, while ultimately rules themselves must be based on nor-
mative or policy choices. 
32. Ian Lovett, To Fight Gridlock, Los Angeles Synchronizes Every Red Light, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
1, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/02/us/to-fight-gridlock-los-angeles-synchro 
nizes-every-red-light.html. 
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function centers on minimizing traffic congestion.  Drawing on data gathered 
from sensors implanted in streets throughout the city, the system automati-
cally chooses the rule (i.e., light color) at each intersection, and at each mo-
ment, that will minimize congestion based on the algorithm’s forecasts. 
Los Angeles’s traffic system provides a concrete and accessible example of 
the use of a machine-learning algorithm in a system that automatically gen-
erates rules.  Although a city’s use of machine learning to operate traffic lights 
may seem somewhat banal, a traffic signaling system provides a point of ref-
erence for seeing how automated rulemaking systems could be developed in 
other contexts.  Even if the regulatory choices in other settings were more 
complex than just “stop” or “go,” as long as a regulator could predetermine 
the array of policy options, specify in advance the overall objective to be 
maximized, and spell out any tradeoffs, a system could in principle be devel-
oped that embeds machine-learning algorithms into an automated deci-
sionmaking structure.  Based on the forecasts produced by these algorithms, 
such a system would generate a final outcome by “choosing” from among 
pre-specified options the one that would maximize the objective given the 
tradeoffs and the resulting algorithm-generated forecasts.  For more complex 
regulatory problems, developing the decisionmaking structure for such a sys-
tem could itself be a considerable challenge—one which will obviously de-
pend on humans to create—but, once created, the system might be able to 
produce and modify rules quickly, a virtue in some settings within a world of 
increasing digital forms of economic and social interaction.  
Still more sophisticated automated rulemaking systems could be based on 
a set of non-learning algorithms called agent-based models (ABM) or multi-
agent systems (MAS), which can have machine-learning algorithms embed-
ded within them.  ABM or MAS algorithms could be developed to model 
mathematically the regulated environment.  In the PEL example, this envi-
ronment comprises the set of all regulated workplaces and the various aspects 
of the workplace setting that could be affected by pollutants.  The modeled 
environment would also contain one of many different possible variants of a 
proposed rule—that is, possible variants of a PEL—and then, in the context 
of the model, simulated regulated “entities” could choose to take actions in 
accordance with, or in contravention to, the rule under analysis.  Machine-
learning algorithms would be embedded within the larger ABM/MAS algo-
rithm and would forecast whether regulated entities would comply with a 
regulation.  The system would then, based on this forecasted compliance, 
determine the net effect of the rule under analysis on the modeled environ-
ment.  The ultimate ability of a regulatory agency to use this fusion of 
ABM/MAS and machine learning to make rules would stem from its ability 
to run multiple iterations of the overall system, with each iteration using a 
different variant of a possible rule.  The system would be designed to select 
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automatically, as the promulgated rule, the variant that yields the best out-
comes in the modeled environment, however “best” is defined in advance by 
the system designers at the regulatory agency. 
Yet, as we have already indicated, even in the most sophisticated cases of 
robotic rulemaking, human involvement will not be entirely absent.  The 
objective function incorporated into any ABM/MAS must reflect normative 
choices that must be made by humans.  Furthermore, the system could not 
itself come up with the multiple possible permutations of the rule from which 
it selects the best.  Some standard templates for different rules would need to 
be identified in advance by humans.  Still, this process could be substantially 
automated; a human could program such a system, for instance, to try every 
possible regulatory variant within a very large range.  In such a case, it would 
be quite reasonable to say that the system, not the human, has in effect cho-
sen the rule autonomously.  Of course, because of resource constraints on 
running complicated algorithms repeatedly, in practice it might be more 
likely the case that humans would first whittle down the possible rule permu-
tations to a more manageable number, from which the system then would 
choose the optimal one. 
Although this vision of regulating by robot has not yet fully materialized 
for workplace health standards or any other federal rulemaking, the fact that 
machine learning is already making rules in slightly different, but fundamen-
tally analogous, ways to govern traffic in the city of Los Angeles shows the 
potential for robotic rulemaking in the future.  Perhaps at some point in the 
future the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Pipeline and Hazardous 
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) could mandate the installation of 
sensors throughout the nation’s pipelines—much like Los Angeles has in-
stalled sensors in all of its roads—and a PHMSA-mandated algorithmic con-
trol system could automatically block off certain sections whenever an algo-
rithm detects unsafe conditions.33  Similar automated rulemaking systems 
might be helpful for regulating high-speed trading on securities markets—or 
in any other setting where government needs to set and adapt rules rapidly.  
The need for rapid, automatic rulemaking systems seems increasingly plau-
sible, if not inevitable, as a response to the private economy’s growing reli-
ance on machine learning, especially as critical infrastructures and economic 
activities themselves increasingly operate automatically by algorithms.  It is 
not at all far-fetched to think that, to regulate a growing data-driven algo-
rithmic private economy, government will need to develop its own automatic 
regulatory systems in response.34  
 
33. See Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 10, at 1167–69 (elaborating on this possibility). 
34. See generally Cary Coglianese, Optimizing Regulation for an Optimizing Economy, 4 U. Pa. J. 
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B. What Makes Machine Learning Distinctive? 
The prospect of novel applications of machine-learning algorithms that 
can automatically determine adjudicatory or regulatory outcomes raises im-
portant legal and policy questions.  Among the most significant of these ques-
tions is one related to governmental transparency.  Machine-learning algo-
rithms possess what is often described as a “black box” nature—that is, they 
discern patterns and make predictions in a way that cannot be intuitively 
understood or explained in the same way as conventional analysis can be.  
To understand why machine-learning algorithms are considered so opaque, 
it is necessary to understand what machine learning is, how it works, and 
what distinguishes it from traditional statistical analysis.35   
At its most general level, an algorithm is little more than a set of steps 
stated in mathematical or logical language.36  From this view, the use of al-
gorithms by government is hardly problematic at all; virtually any deci-
sionmaking process can be characterized as an algorithm.  But taking a closer 
look, we can compare machine learning with more traditional statistical tech-
niques to understand better what makes machine learning distinctive.  Tra-
ditional techniques and machine-learning algorithms do, of course, have 
much in common: they both operate by attempting to achieve a mathemat-
ical goal.  In an ordinary least squares regression, for instance, the goal is to 
minimize the sum of the squared residuals, where the residuals are the dif-
ferences between actual and predicted values.  Machine-learning algorithms 
similarly attempt to achieve mathematical goals, typically referred to as “ob-
jectives” or “objective functions,” and some machine-learning algorithms 
even share the same goals as traditional techniques like ordinary least squares 
regression.37  Furthermore, both techniques attempt to achieve their goals by 
analyzing historical data that have been collected from a population of inter-
est—referred to in the machine-learning literature as the “training data.”38 
But where traditional and machine-learning techniques diverge is in how 
the analysis occurs—that is, how the objective function is met or “opti-  
 
L. & PUB. AFF. 1, 1–13 (2018) (discussing the need for the government to make use of machine 
learning and other digital advances in order to keep better pace with innovations in the private 
sector). 
35. Our account here is highly stylized and general.  We make no claim to describe all 
the myriad ways that machine-learning algorithms can be structured, nor do we provide a 
comprehensive introduction to machine learning. 
36. See Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 640 n.14 
(2017) (defining an algorithm as “a well-defined set of steps for accomplishing a certain goal”). 
37. See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 2, at 671–72. 
38. See PATANJALI KASHYAP, MACHINE LEARNING FOR DECISION MAKERS: COGNITIVE 
COMPUTING FUNDAMENTALS FOR BETTER DECISION MAKING 8, 40, 45 (2017). 
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mized.”  In traditional statistical analysis, humans play the key role in setting 
up the analysis, leaving little to the algorithm.  For example, in a traditional 
regression analysis, humans specify what input variables in the data set the 
regression should consider and how they should be put together to yield a 
prediction, or estimate, of the outcome variable—that is, whether the input 
variables should be added together, multiplied by each other, or take on 
other functional forms.  All that is left for the regression to learn is how the 
variables—or combinations of variables, as specified by the humans—are 
weighted.  In contrast, with machine learning humans do not specify how 
input variables should be put together to yield predictions.  The algorithm 
itself tries many possible combinations of variables, figuring out how to put 
them together to optimize the objective function.39  In other words, the algo-
rithm “learns” how to make accurate predictions or estimates. 
This is not to say that humans have no role in the machine-learning con-
text.  Human analysts exert substantial control over myriad aspects of an algo-
rithm’s functioning.  They are still required to provide the algorithm with its 
data, select a particular kind (or family) of algorithm to implement, and 
“tune” details of the algorithm’s optimization process.40  Humans also play a 
major role in evaluating a learning algorithm’s performance.  Although the 
algorithm learns how to make useful predictions on a set of training data, it 
is not possible to make any meaningful assessment of the algorithm’s accu-
racy with this same historical data set; for a variety of reasons, the real-world 
data onto which the “trained” algorithm is eventually applied in order to 
make predictions will likely differ from the historical data.  Human analysts 
thus purposely separate out some historical data from the training data set 
before they use it.  These separate historical data—called the “test data”—are 
excluded from the training data and, thus, not considered by the algorithm 
during training.  After training, human analysts assess the algorithm’s accu-
racy by using the separate test data, making adjustments to the algorithm as 
necessary to increase accuracy as measured in the test data.41  This is very 
much a process of trial and error—one in which complex, powerful algorithms 
make predictions using methods repeatedly guided and nudged, but not dic-
tated, by humans in the establishment and refinement of the algorithm. 
 
39. See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 2, at 671–72. 
40. For a more detailed discussion of residual human involvement in machine learning, 
see id. at 672–702. 
41. Both the training data and test data include measures of the historical outcomes of 
interest—that is, the outcomes the analyst seeks to predict—as well as a variety of other vari-
ables that the algorithms use to identify patterns associated with and predictive of the out-
comes. 
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Using machine-learning algorithms that are constructed in this way yields 
numerous benefits.  Most significantly, the algorithms’ flexible learning pro-
cess and ability to discern predictively useful patterns in large data sets can 
make them extremely accurate.42  They can outperform traditional statistical 
techniques and, for many tasks, can surpass the abilities of human deci-
sionmakers.43 
Machine-learning algorithms also can facilitate large gains in efficiency.  
Because of their ability to “see” complex patterns, they allow for the automa-
tion of tasks previously thought outside the realm of algorithmic control.  Ma-
chine-learning algorithms can also be continuously refined as new data be-
come available; they can be continuously fed new data, which are 
incorporated into new training data sets on which the algorithm can be au-
tomatically retrained.44 
But these advantages come at a cost to transparency.  Machine-learning 
algorithms are deemed “black boxes” because it is difficult to put into intui-
tive language how they function.45  With a traditional regression analysis, an 
analyst can say exactly how the algorithm’s predictions result: input variable 
values are put together according to the human analyst’s specifications, with 
just the weights, or coefficients, determined by the regression.  Such a simple, 
intuitive explanation is not available for machine-learning algorithms be-
cause the combinations of variables and mathematical relationships between 
them that the algorithms “learn” can be difficult to uncover and, when un-
covered, are often extremely complex.  
Even machine-learning methods that are considered relatively simple 
evade intuitive explanation.  For example, one class of algorithms known as 
“random forests” operates essentially by constructing hundreds or even thou-
sands of classification or regression “trees” and deciding on final predictions 
by averaging or combining predictions from each individual tree.46  An ana-
lyst can examine the structure of a given tree and the predictive rules it dis-
plays, but that information tells the analyst nothing about how predictions 
are made in the forest as a whole.  For still more complex techniques, like 
 
42. See Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 10, at 1158 n.40. 
43. One of the more widely known examples to date has been the success of Google’s 
deep learning system in beating champion human players at the game of Go.  See generally 
David Silver et al., Mastering the Game of Go Without Human Knowledge, 550 NATURE 354 (2017). 
44. See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 2, at 702. 
45. See L. Jason Anastasopoulos & Andrew B. Whitford, Machine Learning for Public Admin-
istration Research, with Application to Organizational Reputation, J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY, 
Nov. 5, 2018, at 16, OXFORD (advance article), https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muy060 
(“Good predictions often require a tradeoff between accuracy and interpretability.”). 
46. See Leo Breiman, Random Forests, 45 MACHINE LEARNING 5, 5–6 (2001). 
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“deep learning” techniques, the inner workings of the algorithms are even 
more difficult to divine and translate into prose.47  
The difficulty of generating intuitive explanations from machine-learning 
algorithms is further exacerbated by the kind of “big data” on which they 
often operate.  Although in principle both machine-learning algorithms and 
more traditional techniques can operate on the same data sets, the predictive 
power of machine learning manifests itself in large, complex data sets, so it 
tends to be these data sets on which learning algorithms are applied.  But 
complex data sets necessarily contain complex inter-variable relationships, 
making it even more difficult to put into intuitive prose how a machine-learn-
ing algorithm makes the predictions it does. 
Even if analysts could discover the inter-variable relationships that a ma-
chine-learning algorithm keys in on, they cannot overlay any causal infer-
ences onto those relationships.48  In other words, they cannot say that a rela-
tionship between an input variable and the output variable is causal in 
nature.  In fact, some of the patterns that are predictively useful might not be 
causal at all, and some may be so non-intuitive as to have never occurred to 
humans—perhaps, say, if the third letter of a tax filer’s last name helps in 
forecasting cases of tax fraud. 
To put machine learning’s advantages and disadvantages into focus, let us 
return to our hypothetical example of an automated system that the FAA 
might use to award commercial pilot licenses.  Such a system could analyze 
the data from all of an applicant’s training flights and other records and use 
that analysis to forecast the applicant’s risk.  Such an algorithm might well 
do a better job of selecting safe pilots than the FAA’s current system—a pro-
spect that would be consistent with learning algorithms’ generally superior 
performance in other contexts and would presumably counsel in favor of the 
FAA giving serious consideration to the use of an algorithmic system.  But 
when it comes to transparency, such an algorithmic system would not enable 
the FAA to provide a conventional, intuitive, prosaic explanation for exactly 
why any specific individual was—or was not—selected to receive a license.49 
As a result, the use of so-called black-box algorithms would seem, at least 
at first glance, to run up against the law’s general requirement that govern-
ment provide adequate reasons for its actions.  Their use might seem to un-
dermine basic good-government principles designed to promote accounta-
bility and build trust.  The question becomes whether, notwithstanding 
 
47. See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 2, at 693 n.135. 
48. See RICHARD A. BERK, STATISTICAL LEARNING FROM A REGRESSION PERSPECTIVE 
331 (2d ed. 2016).  Of course, much traditional statistical analysis, especially absent an over-
arching experimental research design, can also fail to sustain causal claims. 
49. Id. 
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learning algorithms’ advantages, their ostensibly inscrutable nature will keep 
government officials from providing sufficient reasons or explanations for 
why certain decisions were made.  In other words, can government make 
algorithmic outputs sufficiently transparent?  To assess whether the use of 
machine learning by government agencies can be squared with legal expec-
tations of transparency that ordinarily apply to administrative actions, the 
next Part explores in greater depth the relevant legal principles. 
II.  LEGAL PRINCIPLES OF OPEN GOVERNMENT 
Transparency is integral to a legitimate government and a fair society.  
When government is open, officials can be expected to do their jobs better 
because public accountability presumably inhibits them from advancing their 
own self-interests at the expense of their duty to produce public value.50  As 
Louis Brandeis famously quipped, “Sunlight is … the best of disinfectants.”51  
Transparency not only deters officials from taking shortcuts and bribes, it 
also gives other governmental actors—the courts, for example—a basis for 
their oversight roles.52  The visibility of governmental institutions also gives 
other nongovernmental organizations—the media, non-profit advocacy or-
ganizations, academic researchers, law firms, and businesses—the oppor-
tunity to monitor what the government is doing.  When private individuals 
and organizations can learn about what government is doing, they can do a 
better job of organizing their own affairs by anticipating the establishment of 
new laws or understanding changes in government programs.  Significantly, 
in a democracy, transparency can also help build an informed citizenry and 
provide a basis for more meaningful public participation in all facets of gov-
ernmental decisionmaking.53 
 
50. See, e.g., Adriana S. Cordis & Patrick L. Warren, Sunshine as Disinfectant: The Effect of 
State Freedom of Information Act Laws on Public Corruption, 115 J. PUB. ECON. 18, 35–36 (2014) 
(finding a decrease in indicators of corruption following the passage of state open records laws).  
On the importance of public value creation by government officials, see generally MARK H. 
MOORE, CREATING PUBLIC VALUE: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT IN GOVERNMENT (1995). 
51. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 
(1914).  
52. For example, when it comes to overseeing government agencies’ use of machine 
learning under a range of legal doctrines, such as those combatting discrimination, the courts 
will require transparency about algorithms and their use.  See Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 
10, at 1195–1205; Farhad Manjoo, Here’s the Conversation We Really Need to Have About Bias at 
Google, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/30/technol-
ogy/bias-google-trump.html. 
53. See Coglianese et al., supra note 9, at 926–30 (discussing benefits of transparency in 
government). 
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Still, despite its many virtues, governmental transparency can be difficult 
to assess in practice because what “open government” means can vary.  The 
concept of governmental transparency has been invoked in different ways by 
different legal scholars, political theorists, and public officials.54  To provide 
conceptual clarity and a foundation for our analysis of algorithmic govern-
ance, we distinguish in this Part between two types of governmental trans-
parency: “fishbowl transparency” and “reasoned transparency.”55  The for-
mer prioritizes the disclosure of information about what government is doing, 
while the latter aims to promote an understanding of why government does 
what it does.  Both find support in different ways in U.S. administrative law.  
As we will explain more fully in the next Part, both types of transparency are 
also implicated, in different ways, by governmental use of machine learning.  
Due to its ostensibly black-box character, the most distinctive questions 
about machine learning, especially if it is used to replace human deci-
sionmaking, will center on how it may affect the government’s ability to give 
reasons for its actions.  In this Part, we lay the groundwork for an analysis of 
reason-giving as it applies to algorithmic governance.  We begin by elaborat-
ing on fishbowl and reasoned transparency before turning to a review of the 
 
54. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Open Government and Its Impact, REG. REV. (May 8, 2011), 
https://www.theregreview.org/2011/05/08/open-government-and-its-impact/ (observing 
that “little clarity currently exists over what open government means”). 
55. Cary Coglianese, The Transparency President? The Obama Administration and Open Govern-
ment, 22 GOVERNANCE 529, 530, 537 (2009).  The distinction between fishbowl transparency 
and reasoned transparency that we rely on here parallels to a degree the distinction sometimes 
made by computer scientists and other scholars between the transparency of algorithms (i.e., 
access to their parameters and the underlying data they analyze) and the explainability of algo-
rithms (i.e., the reasons why they reach certain results).  See, e.g., AARON RIEKE, MIRANDA 
BOGEN & DAVID G. ROBINSON, PUBLIC SCRUTINY OF AUTOMATED DECISIONS: EARLY 
LESSONS AND EMERGING METHODS 24 (2018), http://www.omidyar.com/sites/de-
fault/files/file_archive/Public%20Scrutiny%20of%20Automated%20Decisions.pdf (distin-
guishing “transparency” from “explanation”); Finale Doshi-Velez & Mason Kortz, Account-
ability of AI Under the Law: The Role of Explanation 6 (2017) (unpublished working paper) 
(on file with the Ethics and Governance of Artificial Intelligence Initiative), http://nrs.har-
vard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:34372584 (“[E]xplanation is distinct from transparency.”).  
However, we eschew the latter terms and rely on the former for two main reasons.  First, we 
want to make clear that we are assessing algorithmic governance against the legal principles 
of governmental transparency that generally apply to all administrative decisions.  Second, 
even in the context of algorithmic governance, the transparency required of an agency’s deci-
sion to use an algorithmic tool could, at least in principle, demand more than just the “ex-
plainability” of the algorithm itself and its functioning; it could also demand openness about 
other factors surrounding the government’s decision to use an algorithmic tool in the first 
place.  
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major principles of governmental reason-giving.  In doing so, we aim to ex-
plicate the core transparency doctrines applicable to the U.S. federal govern-
ment.  As we note in concluding this Part, these doctrines are far from abso-
lute.  At its core, transparency law is pragmatic. 
A. Types of Transparency 
Fishbowl transparency, as its name suggests, refers to the public’s ability 
to peer inside government and acquire information about what officials are 
doing.56  It focuses on public access to information the government holds and 
information about what the government does.  It includes public access to 
government hearings, records stored in filing cabinets, and materials availa-
ble on government computers.  
A series of federal statutes demand that the government provide fishbowl 
transparency.  The Government in the Sunshine Act and the Federal Advi-
sory Committee Act require meetings of multi-member commissions and ad-
visory bodies, respectively, to be open to the public.57  The Freedom of In-
formation Act (FOIA) requires agencies to provide government documents 
to members of the public on request.58  The Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA)59 requires agencies to publish notices of new regulations they propose 
to adopt.60  The E-Government Act calls upon agencies to create websites 
and make information accessible via the Internet.61  These and other legal 
requirements help ensure that those who are affected by governmental deci-
sions can monitor what officials are doing and respond on an informed basis. 
By contrast to fishbowl transparency’s emphasis on public access to infor-
mation about what government is doing, reasoned transparency emphasizes 
the usefulness of that information—that is, whether government reveals why 
 
56. A concrete manifestation of this type of transparency, as well as this terminology, can 
be found in the principles of public access to information under which the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency has long operated and that were originally outlined in what is known as 
the “fishbowl memo” issued in 1983 by then-Administrator William Ruckelshaus.  See Press 
Release, EPA, Ruckelshaus Takes Steps to Improve Flow of Agency Information [Fishbowl 
Policy] (May 19, 1983), https://archive.epa.gov/epa/aboutepa/ruckelshaus-takes-steps-im-
prove-flow-agency-information-fishbowl-policy.html#memo. 
57. Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2018); Federal Advisory Com-
mittee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. § 10(a)(1). 
58. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552. 
59. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 561–570(a), 701–706. 
60. Id. § 553(b). 
61. E–Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899 (2002) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 5, 10, 13, 31, 40, and 44 U.S.C.)  
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it took action.  Reasoned transparency stresses the importance of government 
explaining its actions by giving reasons.62  As one of us has written elsewhere, 
under principles of reasoned transparency, the government must provide ex-
planations that are 
based on application of normative principles to the facts and evidence accumulated by 
decisionmakers—and [that] show why other alternative courses of action were rejected.  
Sound policy explanations are not the same as the kind of account that journalists, 
historians, or social scientists would give if they were trying to explain, as an empirical 
matter, why a policy was in fact adopted, an account that would clearly be aided by an 
expansion of fishbowl transparency.  Instead, reasoned transparency depends on 
making a substantive evaluation of the soundness of an official’s reasoning, not on 
knowing whether that official might have met with one interest group or another.63  
Administrative lawyers will readily recognize that the basis for reasoned 
transparency can be found in the due process clauses of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments64 as well as in the APA’s procedural requirements.65  
Both fishbowl transparency and reasoned transparency are important for 
good government—and both bring with them legal obligations that govern-
ment must honor whenever it relies on machine learning.  These two types 
of transparency are related in another way too: reasoned transparency inher-
ently depends on some level of fishbowl transparency.  After all, for the gov-
ernment to offer a public explanation of why it took a specific action, it must, 
if nothing else, disclose what action it took.  Reasoning also necessitates the 
disclosure of facts that the government has collected and any analyses it has 
conducted that justify its actions.66   
Still, despite this minimal connection, fishbowl and reasoned transparency 
are different kinds of transparency, grounded in different sources of law.  
These differences matter for algorithmic governance because machine learn-
ing presents its most distinctive challenge to reasoned transparency, not fish-
bowl transparency.  The ostensibly black-box nature of machine-learning al-
gorithms raises the question of whether government will be able to explain 
 
62. See generally Martin Shapiro, The Giving Reasons Requirement, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179 
(1992) (discussing federal law’s requirement to give reasons).  
63. Coglianese, supra note 55, at 537. 
64. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.  The elements of procedural due process include a 
requirement for some kind of “statement of reasons for the decision” made by the government 
official.  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 325 n.4 (1976) (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 
U.S. 254 (1970)).  See generally Henry Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 
1279–95 (1975); Citron, supra note 6, at 1281–88. 
65. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
66. See generally Cary Coglianese et al., Seeking Truth for Power: Informational Strategy and Reg-
ulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277 (2004) (discussing the centrality of information to 
governmental decisionmaking). 
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sufficiently why learning algorithms reach the predictions they do.  This is 
not to say that fishbowl transparency does not matter when governments use 
machine learning; rather, that algorithmic governance presents few if any 
truly distinctive questions in terms of fishbowl transparency.  
B. Legal Demands for Reason-Giving 
To determine whether governmental use of machine-learning algorithms 
is compatible with reasoned transparency, it is necessary to understand the 
major sources of the law’s demand for governmental reason-giving.  These 
sources include the doctrines of substantive and procedural due process, rules 
of administrative procedure, and standards for arbitrary and capricious re-
view.  
When governmental adjudication adversely affects private interests pro-
tected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments—“life,” “liberty,” and 
“property”—both substantive and procedural due process will be impli-
cated.67  To comport with the demands of substantive due process, the gov-
ernment’s action must generally be found justifiable as a rational means to 
achieve a legitimate government purpose.68  Separately, procedural due pro-
cess, which also applies, demands that government provide an individual or 
 
67. As Jerry Mashaw has noted, the courts’ application of the due process clauses in the 
Constitution “has dramatically increased the demand for transparently rational administrative 
adjudication.”  Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason and Legitimacy 
in the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 26 (2001). 
68. The same rational basis test also forms the legal analysis under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which has been incorporated into the Fifth Amend-
ment’s due process demands on the federal government.  United States v. Carolene Prods. 
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (holding that substantive due process analysis of “regulatory 
legislation” begins with “the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis”); Bolling v. 
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (basing in the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause the 
application of equal protection constraints on the federal government); see also Minnesota v. 
Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470 n. 12 (1981) (reasoning that, from a “conclusion 
under equal protection” that a law meets the rational basis test, “it follows a fortiori that the 
Act does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause”).  A more demanding 
set of reasons is required under the “strict scrutiny” test when fundamental rights (for due 
process) or suspect classifications (equal protection) are implicated by governmental actions.  
16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 862 (2018).  Given the focus of this Article on general 
principles of transparency and how they are implicated by machine learning’s black-box na-
ture, we only discuss the rational basis test here.  We recognize, of course, that government 
could use machine-learning algorithms to target fundamental rights.  But if heightened scru-
tiny under substantive due process were demanded of a machine-learning application, it 
would not be due to the algorithm’s black-box nature per se, but to the fundamental rights 
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other legal entity deprived of protected interests with notice of its action and 
an opportunity to be heard.69  The precise procedural steps required can vary 
markedly across different adjudicatory settings, but the affected individual 
must be provided enough information about the government’s decisionmak-
ing to permit the individual a fair opportunity to correct for potential errors.70  
At its core, procedural due process requires impartial decisionmaking based 
on accurate evidence and relevant legal rules.  As the Supreme Court noted 
in Goldberg v. Kelly,71 “[t]o demonstrate compliance with this elementary re-
quirement, the decision maker should state the reasons for his determination 
and indicate the evidence he relied on.”72 
Even beyond these constitutional requirements for due process, statutory 
rules of administrative procedure direct federal agencies to provide reasoned 
transparency.  When Congress has dictated in other statutes that agencies 
provide an on-the-record hearing73—that is, engage in so-called formal ad-
judication or rulemaking—the APA requires that agencies provide “a state-
ment of findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefor, on all the 
material issues of fact, law, or discretion.”74  The APA further provides that 
such actions subject to formal procedures must be justified on the basis of 
substantial evidence.75  Of course, most agency actions are not subject to the 
APA’s formal requirements.  Still, even for certain informal actions, agencies 
must provide reasons.  The APA requires that in informal—or “notice-and-
comment”—rulemaking, agencies must provide a “concise statement of the 
basis and purpose” of the rule ultimately adopted.76  In addition, under the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, the most significant rules adopted by Ex-
ecutive Branch agencies must be accompanied by a “written statement” that 
 
implicated by the application of the algorithm. 
69. For a helpful overview of procedural due process requirements, see Sidney A. Shapiro 
& Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement 
of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 405–06, 418 n.144, 431 n.213 
(1987). 
70. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496–97 (1959) (describing as an “immutable” 
principle that whenever governmental action affecting a protected interest “depends on fact 
findings, the evidence used to prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the individual 
so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue”). 
71. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
72. Id. at 271; see also Friendly, supra note 64, at 1268, 1291–92 (describing a “statement 
of reasons” as one of the most important requirements of procedural due process). 
73. See generally United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973). 
74. 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)(3)(A) (2018). 
75. Id. § 706(2)(E). 
76. Id. § 553(c). 
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includes a “qualitative and quantitative assessment” of the estimated costs 
and benefits of the rule.77 
Moreover, agency action subject to judicial review can be struck down if 
a court it finds it to be “arbitrary” and “capricious.”78  The Supreme Court 
has interpreted the APA to require that agencies “examine the relevant data 
and articulate a satisfactory explanation” for each of their actions, especially 
with respect to rulemaking.79  The Court’s interpretation of the arbitrary and 
capricious standard imposes an affirmative obligation on an agency to pro-
vide some kind of administrative record containing evidence and reasons for 
new actions at the time it undertakes them.80  On judicial review, the courts 
will then seek “to determine whether the [agency] has considered the rele-
vant factors and articulated a rational connection between the facts found 
and the choice made.”81 
The requirements imposed by the APA, together with due process re-
quirements for adequate notice and explanation, push administrative agen-
cies to provide reasoned justifications for their actions.  As Jerry Mashaw has 
noted, “[t]he path of American administrative law has been the path of the 
progressive submission of power to reason.”82  Reasoning requires going be-
yond mere expediency, whim, or self-interest.83  Agencies need to be able to 
explain their choices as based on evidence and justified in terms of the criteria 
 
77. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).  Similar requirements for the most significant 
rulemakings have been imposed by executive order.  See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. 
Reg. 51,735 (1993). 
78. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see also id. § 702 (providing the right of judicial review for any 
person “adversely affected” by final agency action). 
79. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
80. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) (reasoning 
that although agencies are not necessarily required to make formal findings, courts must ex-
amine the “full administrative record that was before the [agency] at the time [of its] deci-
sion”); see also Encino Motorcars, L.L.C. v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2127 (2016); State Farm, 
463 U.S. at 42; SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94–95 (1943). 
81. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 105 (1983) (inter-
nal citations omitted). 
82. Mashaw, supra note 67, at 26. 
83. Not even the change in political ideology of an administration’s leadership, occa-
sioned by a presidential election, constitutes a sufficient reason for agency action.  State Farm, 
463 U.S. at 42; see also Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 657–58 (1995) 
(observing that “[a] reason-giving mandate will . . . drive out illegitimate reasons when they 
are the only plausible explanation for particular outcomes”). 
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or purposes contained within the statutes governing their authority.84 
Satisfying the law’s reason-giving requirement also necessarily entails 
some degree of fishbowl disclosure.  At a minimum, the government must 
disclose the information in its possession that provided the factual basis for 
its decision.  In the rulemaking context, administrative law has generally 
pushed agencies to make publicly available all of the information that is be-
fore the agency at the time of its decision, including information that might 
run counter to the agency’s decision.85  To justify a rulemaking decision, an 
agency must confront adverse information and contrary arguments pre-
sented in public comments, and it must explain why such information and 
arguments do not undermine the basis for the agency’s rule.86 
C. Law’s Pragmatism About Open Government 
Notwithstanding these various legal demands for open government, the 
law does not require that the government provide total transparency.  Fish-
bowl transparency necessitates an openness that would be better described 
as translucent, not transparent.  FOIA contains nine major exemptions from 
disclosure, including those related to personnel information, law enforce-
ment protocols, and confidential business information and trade secrets.87  
Furthermore, the APA does not require that agencies provide public notice 
for all new rules.  In fact, the APA’s “good cause” exemption88 is wide enough 
that, according to Connor Raso’s empirical research, many federal agencies’ 
regulatory issuances occur under that exemption and thus are issued without 
any advance notice at all.89  
Another exemption in the APA allows certain agency actions to escape 
judicial oversight.  Although the APA establishes a presumption in favor of 
judicial review of all final agency actions—and thus subjects such actions to 
 
84. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416 (noting that under the arbitrary and capricious standard, 
the agency must show that it “acted within the scope of [its] statutory authority” and its deci-
sion “was based on a consideration of the relevant factors”). 
85. Some statutes require agencies to maintain a publicly accessible rulemaking docket 
with all such information.  E.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (2018).  The advent of the 
federal web portal, Regulations.gov, now makes it relatively easy for agencies to provide such 
docket information online. 
86. See, e.g., United States v. N.S. Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977) 
(“It is not in keeping with the rational process to leave vital questions, raised by comments 
which are of cogent materiality, completely unanswered.”). 
87. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)–(9) (2018). 
88. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B).  
89. Connor Raso, Agency Avoidance of Rulemaking Procedures, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 65 (2015). 
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the potential application of the arbitrary and capricious test—this presump-
tion does not apply to agency actions that are “committed to agency discre-
tion by law”90 or for which there is “no law to apply.”91  Courts treat these 
categories as narrowly defined, but the Supreme Court has held that govern-
ment decisions about whom to inspect or target for enforcement are commit-
ted to agency discretion—meaning that an agency need not explain why it 
chooses to investigate certain individuals or facilities but not others.92  Agen-
cies effectively have complete discretion over whom they choose to target.93  
Even for actions that are subject to judicial review, reasoned transparency 
usually does not require exhaustive or extensive explanations.  The rational ba- 
sis test for substantive due process, for instance, is hardly any test at all.  The 
relationship between a governmental action and a proper purpose need only 
be “debatably rational”94 and the government’s purpose can be merely “con-
ceivably legitimate.”95  Indeed, to withstand the rational basis test, the gov-
ernment never actually needs to give any reason at all; the test merely requires 
that a reason could be found linking a government action to a legitimate end.96 
 
90. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). 
91. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971). 
92. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).  Another category excluded from ju-
dicial review comprises “non-actions,” such as decisions to avoid initiating a rulemaking, at 
least if no statutory obligation or deadline compels taking action.  See generally Cary Coglianese 
& Daniel Walters, Agenda-Setting in the Regulatory State: Theory and Evidence, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 93 
(2016) (discussing agenda-setting at administrative agencies). 
93. Of course, if agencies’ targeting practices are based on unconstitutionally discrimina-
tory grounds, the courts may certainly step in.  Cf. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 
2d 540, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding that New York City had “adopted a policy of indirect 
racial profiling by targeting racially defined groups for stops based on local crime suspect data” 
with the result of “disproportionate and discriminatory stopping of blacks and Hispanics in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause”).  Furthermore, for inspections of business facilities, 
once a specific facility has been targeted for inspection, the government may be required to 
obtain a search warrant to gain access to the facility to conduct the inspection and thus would 
need to provide a reason for its requested search.  But that reason could be simply that the 
facility has been identified for inspection “on the basis of a general administrative plan for the 
enforcement of the [law] derived from neutral sources.”  Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 
307, 331–32 (1978).  It may perhaps seem unnecessary to note that, once the government 
conducts an inspection and seeks to impose a fine for noncompliance, it must then provide 
reasons, grounded in law and in fact, for why penalties should be imposed. 
94. Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist., 854 F.2d 751, 753 (5th Cir. 1988) (explicating 
the test for rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause).  The rational basis test is 
the same for substantive due process and equal protection.  See supra note 68. 
95. Reid, 854 F.2d at 753. 
96. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).  
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Procedural due process might seem to hold more bite.  But even there, the 
Court has made it clear that the reasons agencies must provide in the adju-
dicatory context “need not amount to a full opinion, or even formal findings 
of fact and conclusions of law.”97  More generally, the demands of procedural 
due process are now encapsulated under a balancing test that calls upon 
courts to make pragmatic judgments about how strict procedural demands 
should be, expressly taking into account the impact of potential procedural 
demands on governmental resources.98  
With respect to the APA, although the arbitrary and capricious test is often 
referred to as “hard look” review, the Supreme Court has made clear that 
“the scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is narrow, 
and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”99  The 
Court has instructed judges to “uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if 
the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.”100  
The Supreme Court has also made clear that judicial inquiry into an 
agency’s reasoning does not entail anything like the extensive discovery pro-
cess that typically takes place in civil litigation.  Rather, review is limited to 
what the agency had available in its record at the time of its decision.101  
Courts cannot compel the cross-examination of evidence supplied by the 
agency.102  Courts also ordinarily must not “probe the mental processes of 
the Secretary in reaching his conclusions”103—they merely can look to the 
reasons that agency officials have provided.104 
Furthermore, when the reasons that an agency offers depend on highly 
technical matters, such as those demanding statistical and scientific expertise, 
courts give the agency considerable deference.  In its decision in Baltimore Gas 
 
97. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970). 
98. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); see also Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 10, 
at 1184–91. 
99. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
100. Id. (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 
286 (1974)). 
101. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); see also SEC v. 
Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943). 
102. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 541 
(1978). 
103. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938). 
104. The requirement is not to offer an empirical or psychological description of the or-
igins of a decision, but rather to provide a legal or policy justification for it.  As Frederick 
Schauer has noted, “[d]escription is not justification.”  Schauer, supra note 83, at 651.  
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& Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,105 the Supreme Court cau-
tioned that courts should not second-guess a government agency when it is 
“making predictions, within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers of 
science.”106  The Court emphasized that, “[w]hen examining this kind of sci-
entific determination, as opposed to simple findings of fact, a reviewing court 
must generally be at its most deferential.”107  
Judges by and large do not hold agencies to extremely high standards of 
rationality under the arbitrary and capricious standard.  Rather, as Adrian 
Vermeule has noted, they are simply looking to rule out “clear and indefen-
sible legal error or irrationality.”108  Vermeule has reported that, of the sixty-
four cases since 1982 in which the Supreme Court has considered an agency 
action under the arbitrary and capricious test, the Court has upheld the 
agency decision over ninety percent of the time.109 
It is clear that, although administrative law does demand both fishbowl and 
reasoned transparency, the demands of each are far from onerous.110  Trans-
parency law has been largely pragmatic.  Fishbowl transparency requirements 
include exemptions that take into account administrative imperatives, and 
 
105. 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983). 
106. Id. 
107. Id.  See also FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 782 (2016) (noting 
the narrowness of arbitrary and capricious review and stating that “nowhere is that more true 
than in a technical area”); Mobil Oil Expl. & Producing Se. v. United Distrib. Cos., 498 U.S. 
211, 231 (1991) (explaining that “we are neither inclined nor prepared to second-guess the 
agency’s reasoned determination in this complex area”). 
108. ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION 34 (2016).  See also Thomas O. McGarity 
& Wendy E. Wagner, Legal Aspects of the Regulatory Use of Environmental Modeling, 33 ENVTL. L. 
REP. 10,751, 10,757 (2003) (“Despite the high level of judicial deference, EPA’s models are 
frequently subject to tedious, technical nitpicking . . . .  Courts often consider these challenges 
in detail, but if after this analysis the courts discover that the disagreement concerns a battle 
of the experts, they typically defer to the Agency’s judgment.”). 
109. VERMEULE, supra note 108, at 158. 
110. Some administrative law scholars have asserted that judicial review under the arbi-
trary and capricious standard does impose a heavy burden on agencies.  Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 
Rulemaking Ossification Is Real: A Response to Testing the Ossification Thesis, 80 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1493 (2012).  However, researchers who have investigated these claims empirically and 
systematically have found them wanting.  Cary Coglianese, Empirical Analysis and Administrative 
Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1111 (2002); William S. Jordan III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary 
and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Infor-
mal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393 (2000); Anne J. O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: 
An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 896 (2008); Jason W. 
Yackee & Susan W. Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal 
Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950-1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1414 (2012). 
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agencies have accordingly managed to adapt their operations to provide rou-
tinized disclosure of government information.111  When it comes to reasoned 
transparency, courts do expect agencies to explain themselves, at least when 
they take actions not committed to agency discretion; however, they also give 
agencies considerable deference as to what counts as sufficient reasoning.112 
III.  REASON-GIVING IN ALGORITHMIC GOVERNANCE 
Having established what transparency law demands, we now turn to the 
question of whether—or how—governmental reliance on machine learning 
might meet those demands.  As for any legal question, the answer will ulti-
mately depend on how government actually uses machine learning—and 
even on what kind of machine-learning algorithm it uses.  After all, machine 
learning itself refers to a broad range of techniques which apply to varied 
types of data, perform many different functions, and vary in their mathemat-
ical complexity.  Any general analysis must thus proceed with appropriate 
caveats.  
We also must acknowledge that there will always be ways that government 
could conceivably use machine learning that would clearly violate both fish-
bowl and reasoned transparency requirements.  It would be obviously irre-
sponsible and unlawful for a governmental authority to rely on machine-
learning algorithms deceptively by both concealing the automation of other-
wise reviewable actions and offering no valid independent reasons for those 
actions.  More generally, the government could always act maliciously and 
deceptively to bias machine learning’s results to achieve nefarious policy 
ends.  We are mindful of these possibilities, but we also recognize that nefar-
 
111. This is not to say that agency practices under FOIA have been optimal—or even 
sufficient.  Some observers have lamented what they perceive to be the high costs of FOIA 
compliance.  See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes, REGULATION, 
Mar.–Apr. 1982, at 15, 16.  Others have noted that government agencies are far from prompt 
or forthcoming in responding to requests for information.  See, e.g., SEAN MOULTON & GAVIN 
BAKER, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T, MAKING THE GRADE: ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
SCORECARD 2015 (Mar. 2015), https://www.foreffectivegov.org/ sites/default/files/info/ac-
cess-to-information-scorecard-2015.pdf; Delayed, Denied, Dismissed: Failures on the FOIA Front, 
PROPUBLICA (July 21, 2016, 8:01 AM), https://www.propublica. org/article/delayed-denied-
dismissed-failures-on-the-foia-front (noting that government agencies are far from prompt or 
forthcoming in responding to requests for information).  For findings from a government audit 
of FOIA practices, see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-452T, FREEDOM OF 
INFORMATION ACT: AGENCIES ARE IMPLEMENTING REQUIREMENTS BUT NEED TO TAKE 
ADDITIONAL ACTIONS (2018). 
112. See supra notes 108–109 and accompanying text. 
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ious governmental action can take place entirely independently of any appli-
cation of machine learning.  The possibility of dishonest, oppressive, or even 
evil government should never be dismissed—but it is a concern separate from 
our focus here. 
Arguably equally concerning, though, would be the possibility that a gov-
ernment agency uses machine learning merely irresponsibly or in a techni-
cally uninformed manner.  As mentioned, the development of machine-
learning algorithms, especially for the kinds of specialized applications to 
which they would be applied by government officials, is a challenging en-
deavor.  It requires expertise in statistics and computer or information sci-
ence.  It also requires knowledge of how policy choices can be embedded in 
mathematical choices made while designing the algorithm.  It is certainly 
conceivable—and perhaps likely under current conditions—that many gov-
ernment agencies will not have staff with the requisite expertise to make these 
choices in an informed way.113  Indeed, perhaps this is why governmental 
authorities that have so far looked to machine learning have tended to con-
tract with private companies to obtain the relevant expertise to develop their 
algorithmic applications.  To oversee adequately the private contracting of 
algorithmic design, though, governments still need sufficient in-house exper-
tise to ask the right questions and demand that their contractors act respon-
sibly and with the appropriate degree of transparency.  
Of course, we also must recognize that in many instances government of-
ficials will use machine learning in myriad ways that will hardly even impli-
cate transparency law at all.  When the U.S. Postal Service uses machine-
learning algorithms in its mail-sorting equipment to “read” handwritten zip 
codes, and when the National Weather Service uses machine-learning algo-
rithms to help generate weather forecasts, no serious transparency concerns 
arise.114  Even less banal uses, such as the use of machine learning to identify 
targets for subsequent human inspection or auditing, may also easily satisfy 
transparency law—if for no reason other than that the legal demands in some 
of these circumstances will be minimal.  Agency use of algorithms for law 
 
113. On the need for adequate resources and human capital to take advantage of algo-
rithmic governance, see Coglianese, supra note 34; Robert L. Glicksman, David L. Markell & 
Claire Monteleoni, Technological Innovation, Data Analytics, and Environmental Enforcement, 44 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 41, 47 (2017) (“Optimal use of big data . . . will require [government] to hire 
experts in data analytics and make significant investments in computer systems capable of 
collecting, transporting, storing, and analyzing the data.”). 
114. For background on the U.S. Postal Service’s use of hand-writing learning algorithms 
and the National Weather Service’s use of machine learning in meteorological forecasting, see 
Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 10, at 1162. 
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enforcement targeting, after all, would presumably fall outside of both 
FOIA’s requirements and the scope of judicial review under the APA.115  
Similarly, whenever governmental agencies use machine-learning analysis as 
but one factor in a larger human decisionmaking process or as a mere sup-
plement to human decisionmaking, they should experience relatively few dif-
ficulties in satisfying transparency laws’ demands—as long as the human of-
ficials have sufficient independent reasons to justify their actions.116 
The more interesting, and presumably more difficult, cases will arise when 
the government uses machine learning in outcome-determinative ways to 
make consequential and nondiscretionary decisions.  We referred earlier to 
cases like these as ones of either regulating by robot or adjudicating by algorithm, 
denoting situations where automated, algorithmic systems essentially make 
governmental decisions by either establishing policies or resolving individual 
disputes or claims.  We draw here on these outcome-determinative uses of 
machine learning to create something of a test case for the purpose of ana-
lyzing whether government can meet transparency standards.  If government 
agencies that use machine learning can satisfy the law’s demands for trans-
parency when used in such determinative ways, then their use of such algo-
rithms in other, less determinative applications should by extension pass mus-
ter.117 
 
115. See supra notes 87–89 and accompanying text. 
116. If an agency cannot provide any independent reasons for its decision, then machine 
learning cannot really be serving as a mere supplement to human decisionmaking—because, 
by definition, if the algorithm is a mere supplement then there must be some reason other 
than the algorithm’s output.  On the other hand, it is possible for a human official to have 
another reason but still to have the human judgment depend on an algorithm’s output.  A 
human decisionmaker might say, “I decide X whenever my human judgment is to do X, based 
on Y reason, and when the algorithm’s output is Z.”  In such a case, where the human deci-
sionmaker depends on some affirmation from the algorithm to support a decision, the human-
generated reason may be separate from the algorithm but it is still contingent on and interac-
tive with the algorithm’s output.  Such a case is one that we will treat here, for our purposes, 
as conceptually indistinguishable from the complete substitution of the algorithm for human 
decisionmaking, as the human decision is not entirely independent of the algorithm. 
117. As the discussion in the previous note ought to indicate, by “determinative” or “out-
come determinative,” we mean that the justification for a particular governmental action lies 
purely with the algorithm and its output.  It does not matter whether the government’s action 
is itself entirely executed by a machine or whether the machine’s output needs to be ratified 
pro forma by a human official, provided that the sole justificatory basis for the action results 
from the algorithm.  Although we use terms like “determinative” to distinguish qualitatively 
different degrees of reliance on algorithms, it is not essential to delve into the metaphysics of 
decisionmaking to claim that the government’s decision was in fact “made” by an algorithm.  
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We begin this Part by reiterating the distinction between fishbowl and rea-
soned transparency, both of which could be implicated by specific govern-
mental uses of machine learning.  Much criticism of machine learning em-
phasizes fishbowl transparency, but any problems with fishbowl transparency 
created by the government’s application of machine learning are neither new 
nor particularly difficult to resolve.  It is reasoned transparency that would 
appear to be most distinctively implicated by machine learning’s black-box 
nature.  Consequently, after initially distinguishing fishbowl and reasoned 
transparency, we next turn to the kind of reasons that analysts can offer about 
how algorithms work—that is, how they can peer inside the black box.  We 
conclude that government officials should be able quite easily to satisfy the 
demands of reasoned transparency.  A high-level explanation of an algorithm’s 
functioning is both possible and legally sufficient.  Beyond this, we also high-
light in the final section of this Part the many technical advances that ma-
chine-learning researchers are making to improve methods for extracting 
reasons from algorithms, enabling officials to go beyond what is legally re-
quired when explaining their algorithms.  Given the current ability of agen-
cies to meet prevailing legal demands, combined with the promise of ongoing 
technical advances in the explainability of machine learning, whatever un-
ease may remain about algorithmic governance should only wane with time. 
A. Situating Fishbowl and Reasoned Transparency 
Fishbowl transparency figures prominently in contemporary discussion of 
machine learning.  Critics worry about a world “increasingly controlled by 
secret models.”118  Investigative reporters emphasize “the largely hidden effect 
of algorithms,” raising worries about the “proprietary” nature of algorithms   
 
As one of us has suggested in another context, in any governmental setting where there may 
be multiple potential sources of input, it may be difficult to single out any one source as the 
decisionmaker.  Cf. Cary Coglianese, The Emptiness of Decisional Limits: Reconceiving Presidential 
Control of the Administrative State, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 43 (2017); Cary Coglianese & Kristin Firth, 
Separation of Powers Legitimacy: An Empirical Inquiry into Norms About Executive Power, 164 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1869 (2016).  For another, when human officials have designed an algorithmic system 
and chosen to use it as the basis for making decisions, those officials still have some meaningful 
claim to having shaped even a particular decision by having created and used the algorithmic 
system.  Our purpose in this Article is simply to use terms like “determinative” in a conven-
tional sense to connote the government’s reliance on the output of an algorithm as the pivotal 
factor that justifies a particular decision. 
118. CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES 
INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 13 (2016).  O’Neil also worries about what she 
characterizes as the “arbitrary” nature of learning algorithms—a reasoned transparency con-
cern.  Id. 
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developed for courts by private contractors who do “not publicly disclose the 
calculations used.”119  Researchers study algorithmic transparency by filing 
FOIA-type requests with state and local governments, finding “a big gap be-
tween the importance of algorithmic processes for governance and public 
access to those algorithms.”120 
Clearly, algorithmic governance presents real concerns about fishbowl 
transparency.121  Governmental use of machine learning generates a broad 
range of potentially disclosable information, including the algorithm’s source 
code, its objective function, its specifications and tuning parameters, its train-
ing and test data sets, and the programming details of any ancillary computer 
programs that translate its predictions into actions.122  The desire for public 
access to some or all of this information is understandable, especially if dis-
closure of at least some information is needed to provide a satisfactory rea-
soned explanation of actions determined by algorithms.  
Not surprisingly, concerns about fishbowl transparency have also found 
their way into litigation over algorithmic governance.  In Wisconsin, a crim-
inal defendant challenged a state trial court’s use of a risk assessment algo-
rithm in determining his sentence.123  Among other claims, the defendant 
argued that his due process rights were effectively violated by the trial court 
 
119. See Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias: There’s Software Used Across the Country to Predict 
Future Criminals.  And it’s Biased Against Blacks., PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www. 
propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing.  For a discus-
sion of the statistical errors in the ProPublica report, see Jennifer Doleac & Megan Stevenson, 
Are Criminal Risk Assessment Scores Racist?, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Aug. 22, 2016), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2016/08/22/are-criminal-risk-assessment-
scores-racist/. 
120. Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart City, 20 
YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 132–33 (2018). 
121. Others have raised similar concerns.  See, e.g., Citron, supra note 6, at 1291–93 (dis-
cussing tension between FOIA and the limited information governments have provided about 
automated decision systems used by governments); Joshua A. Kroll et al., supra note 36, at 638 
(noting that machine learning “is particularly ill-suited to source code analysis”—which the 
authors describe as “the most obvious approach” to providing transparency about automated 
decision tools). 
122. See generally Lehr & Ohm, supra note 2 (describing various features of a machine-
learning algorithm). 
123. State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016).  The case centered on the court’s 
reliance on the “COMPAS” algorithm that figured in the investigative report cited in Angwin, 
supra note 119.  COMPAS does not appear to be a machine-learning algorithm.  See Coglianese 
& Lehr, supra note 10, at 1205 n.232.  However, the legal issues presented in the case are still 
relevant here to our analysis of machine-learning algorithms. 
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because of “the proprietary nature” of the algorithm on which the trial court 
had relied.124  The algorithm had been developed by a private firm that con-
sidered it “a trade secret” and thus would “not disclose how the risk scores 
are determined or how the factors are weighed.”125  The defendant argued 
that this secrecy “denied [him] information which the [trial] court considered 
at sentencing,” constituting a violation of his rights to procedural due pro-
cess.126  Ultimately, the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s 
argument, pointing to the fact that the private firm had released a full list of 
variables used in calculating risk scores and then noting that the risk analysis 
was entirely “based upon [the defendant’s own] answers to questions and 
publicly available data about his criminal history.”127  The court held that 
the availability of this information afforded the defendant the requisite “op-
portunity to verify that the questions and answers listed on the [risk assess-
ment] report were accurate.”128 
The outcome in the Wisconsin case suggests that governmental authorities 
can lawfully use algorithms without divulging all the potentially disclosable 
information about them.  Although under some circumstances some infor-
mation about algorithms might well need to be released under FOIA, trans-
parency law certainly does not require full disclosure of everything.129  A gov-
ernment agency that uses machine learning to identify facilities to inspect, 
for example, would presumably not need to disclose information about how 
its algorithm operates, as that information would be covered by the exemp-
tion for law enforcement-related information.130  Moreover, as the Wisconsin 
case confirms, if a government agency contracts with a private company to 
design and deploy an algorithm, that company can lawfully claim that vari-
ous pieces of algorithmic information are trade secrets that must be protected 
from disclosure.131  In addition, some of the underlying data used in particu-
lar machine-learning applications might be subject to various legal privacy 
 
124. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 757. 
125. Id. at 761. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. (rejecting the defendant’s other arguments as well, although it was important to 
the court’s rulings on those other ground—but not at all mentioned in its ruling on procedural 
due process—that the risk assessment scores were not used in a determinative way but were 
merely one factor in sentencing decisions).  
129. For a discussion of the circumstances under which algorithmic information might 
need to be disclosed, see Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 10, at 1209–12. 
130. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2018). 
131. Id. § 552(b)(4). 
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protections, such as where data are drawn from individual medical, educa-
tional, credit, or census records.132 
Admittedly, from the standpoint of anyone concerned about robust fish-
bowl transparency, the fact that information can be lawfully withheld due to 
trade secret and other FOIA exemptions might do little more than restate 
the problem.  Legal or not, the information is still withheld from the public.  
In some circumstances, a reasonable case might well be made on policy 
grounds against the withholding of information—and for greater disclosure 
than the law requires.133  On the other hand, valid and important policy rea-
sons do exist to protect the confidentiality of certain types of information, so 
the law’s exemptions from disclosure might still be justified on policy 
grounds.134  It is not our purpose here to engage in a policy debate over how 
much fishbowl transparency the government should provide, nor is it to an-
alyze the proper scope of data privacy laws on policy grounds.  Rather, in 
highlighting how, under current law, governmental entities that rely on algo-
rithmic systems need not disclose all potentially disclosable information 
about these systems, we seek to draw two main implications about the role 
for fishbowl transparency in analyzing the legal viability of machine learning.   
The first implication is that any questions about the optimal level of fish-
bowl transparency run orthogonal to an analysis of machine learning and its 
black-box character.  For example, consider concerns about government 
agencies outsourcing algorithmic development to private contractors.  Noth-
ing about machine learning raises distinctive concerns about the role of pri-
vate actors in supporting government functions or about the protection of 
confidential business information used by government officials.  Debates over 
the relationship between public and private actors extend much more 
broadly than the current debate about machine learning.  Some policymak-
ers and scholars advocate greater privatization of government services, while 
others oppose extensive outsourcing and urge greater reliance on govern-
ment bureaucrats.135  In much the same vein, consider claims about the need 
 
132. See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936; The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1232g; The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)-(x) (2018). 
133. On related issues, one of us has put forward recommendations for best practices in 
transparency that go beyond disclosure that is legally mandated.  Coglianese et al., supra note 
9, at 934–46.  Our legal analysis here does not necessarily mean that compliance with the law 
defines the entirety of good government practices. 
134. Coglianese et al., supra note 66, at 330–31. 
135. See generally JOHN J. DIIULIO, JR., BRING BACK THE BUREAUCRATS: WHY MORE 
FEDERAL WORKERS WILL LEAD TO BETTER (AND SMALLER!) GOVERNMENT (2014); PAUL R. 
VERKUIL, VALUING BUREAUCRACY: THE CASE FOR PROFESSIONAL GOVERNMENT (2017); 
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for secrecy to protect the intellectual property rights of algorithm developers.  
Some proponents of intellectual property rights urge stronger protections to 
promote innovation, while others favor weaker rights to discourage market 
abuses or combat inequities—but this debate rages on even outside the con-
text of machine learning.136  The point is simply that many of the concerns 
about machine learning and fishbowl transparency implicate much larger 
debates.  The policy considerations relevant in other contexts will be basically 
identical to what is needed to address the debate over the optimal level of 
fishbowl transparency in a world of algorithmic governance.   
Moreover, even if the optimal level of fishbowl transparency does call for 
expanded disclosure in connection with algorithmic governance, the solu-
tions will have little or nothing to do with machine learning per se.  If the 
concern is with the proprietary nature of algorithms developed by private 
contractors, government agencies could expand fishbowl transparency 
simply by changing the terms of their contracts to clarify or even waive trade-
secret protections.137  Or perhaps, instead of contracting with private firms, 
agencies could create open-source competitions for the design of algorithms138 
or build their own in-house expertise so they do not need to rely on private 
contractors.139  Irrespective of the actual role played by private contractors, 
whenever government agencies develop their own algorithmic systems, they 
can always consult with independent reviewers and advisory committees or 
solicit public input through a notice-and-comment process.140  These are all 
readily available solutions.  None are novel, and none have anything to do 
with machine learning’s distinctive “black-box” character.  In the end, the 
challenges in identifying and providing an optimal level of fishbowl transpar-
ency in a world of algorithmic governance are simply not unique to machine 
learning. 
The second implication we wish to draw about machine learning and fish-
bowl transparency is that this kind of transparency can indirectly but inte-
 
Mildred E. Warner, Reversing Privatization, Rebalancing Government Reform: Markets, Deliberation and 
Planning, 27 POL’Y & SOC’Y 163 (2008). 
136. MEIR PEREZ PUGATCH, THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DEBATE (2006). 
137. This is Brauneis and Goodman’s chief recommendation.  Brauneis & Goodman, 
supra note 120, at 164–66. 
138. Edward L. Glaeser et al., Crowdsourcing City Government: Using Tournaments to Improve 
Inspection Accuracy, 106 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 1 (2016).  
139. Coglianese, supra note 34. 
140. See, e.g., Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 10, at 1190–91 (discussing use of advisory 
committees and rulemaking proceedings).  For further discussion of the role of advisory com-
mittees and notice-and-comment rulemaking, see supra notes 57 and 60 and accompanying 
text. 
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grally affect government’s ability to meet the demands of reasoned transpar-
ency.  It is reasoned transparency, after all, that does appear to pose a dis-
tinctive challenge for algorithmic governance.  As we noted earlier, because 
reasoned transparency is all about explanation and meaning—the ability of 
government to say why and how an action was taken—the black-box nature 
of algorithms seems, at least at first glance, to threaten this form of transpar-
ency in potentially novel ways.  But it is important to keep in mind that gov-
ernment agencies’ ability to satisfy the demands of reasoned transparency 
could very much be affected by the extent of their fishbowl transparency.  
A recent preliminary decision issued by a federal district court in Texas 
illustrates this connection between fishbowl transparency and reasoned 
transparency.  The court’s decision arose in a case centered on a Houston 
school district’s use of algorithms to rate their teachers’ performance and to 
provide the district a basis for dismissing poorly rated teachers.141  The school 
district relied on an outside vendor to develop and run its algorithmic system, 
and the vendor treated its “algorithms and software as trade secrets, refusing 
to divulge them to either [the school district] or the teachers themselves.”142  
Nine teachers and the local teachers’ union challenged the school district’s 
reliance on the algorithms on multiple grounds, including the procedural due 
process claim that, without “access to the computer algorithms and data nec-
essary to verify the accuracy of their scores,” they were denied their consti-
tutional rights.143   
The district court rejected the school district’s motion for summary judg-
ment on the procedural due process claim, finding that the teachers had put 
forward enough evidence to take their case to the jury.144  The court asserted 
that, “without access to . . . proprietary information—the value-added equa-
tions, computer source codes, decision rules, and assumptions—[the teach-
ers’] scores will remain a mysterious ‘black box,’ impervious to challenge.”145  
The court did not question trade secret protection itself.  It accepted the 
school district’s argument that “‘the Due Process Clause does not empower 
Plaintiffs to put [the vendor] out of business’ by requiring the disclosure of its 
 
141. Hous. Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 3d 
1168 (S.D. Tex. 2017).  It is not altogether clear from the court’s opinion whether the algo-
rithm at issue was a machine-learning algorithm, but the relevant legal issues we discuss here 
are indistinguishable from those that would be implicated by learning algorithms. 
142. Id. at 1177. 
143. Id. at 1176. 
144. Id. at 1180. 
145. Id. at 1179. 
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trade secrets.”146  Rather, the court said that the question for the jury was 
simply whether “a policy of making high stakes employment decisions based 
on secret algorithms [is] incompatible with minimum due process.”147  If it is 
incompatible, the remedy would be for the school district to find some other 
policy that does not rely on secret algorithms, not to repudiate a firm’s trade 
secrets.148  The upshot is that reasoned transparency can become affected by 
limits on fishbowl transparency whenever sufficient reasons for decisions 
based on machine learning require the disclosure of confidential source code 
or other trade secrets. 
Importantly, though, the preliminary nature of the district court’s decision 
in the Texas case means that the court did not rule out the possibility that, 
with further evidence presented at a trial, a jury could still properly find for 
the school district.149  It might be possible to protect trade secrets while still 
providing teachers with sufficient information to satisfy the demands of pro-
cedural due process.  Just as in the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision, cir-
cumstances may exist where the government can rely on a private contractor 
but still put forward enough non-proprietary information to provide ade-
quate reasons for machine learning decisions.  We thus turn next to what it 
means for government to offer adequate reasons in the context of algorithmic 
governance. 
B. The Adequacy of Reason-Giving in Algorithmic Governance 
To discern what reasons government must give to support determinative 
uses of machine learning, let us begin by assuming, for the sake of analysis, a 
setting in which there exist no limitations whatsoever on public disclosure of 
information related to a given algorithmic system.  Any interested person can 
be given access to that algorithm’s objective function, its specifications (e.g., 
the kind of algorithm selected, a list of what the input variables were, and the 
algorithm’s tuning parameters), the training and testing data, and even the 
full source code.  As a result, all interested persons will be able to access eve-
rything about that algorithm and even test it out for themselves.  In principle, 
then, all members of the public and all affected persons could conceivably 
understand how the algorithm works as well as does anyone in government.  
Still, even with this assumed full disclosure, there will remain some irreduci-
ble inscrutability, at least compared to what can be obtained when using tra-





149. Id. at 1173 (explaining the summary judgment standard). 
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how exactly learning algorithms operate—that is, exactly what relationships 
they are keying in on and how those relationships affect the predictions.150  
Would this inherent level of inscrutability, even assuming a best-case scenario 
of full fishbowl transparency, bar federal agencies from relying on machine-
learning algorithms?151     
The answer would almost certainly be “no.”  Machine-learning algo-
rithms’ irreducible inscrutability should not form a bar to their use by gov-
ernment officials, even to substitute for human decisionmaking in circum-
stances where adequate reasons must be given.  What will count as an 
adequate reason will vary depending on the legal source of the reason-giving 
requirement, but in general, as we explained in Part II, the law’s demand for 
reason-giving is neither absolute nor total.152  Ultimately it is pragmatic.  
Transparency law can assuredly accommodate a government agency’s 
choice to employ a state-of-the-art tool that can improve accurate deci-
sionmaking in the service of a valid governmental purpose, even if the nature 
of that tool is such that it does not readily permit the government to offer 
intuitive accounts of its inner workings in the same way as traditional but 
often less accurate statistical tools. 
1. Substantive Due Process 
Consider first the reason-giving needed to meet the rational basis test of 
substantive due process.  As we indicated earlier, it may be a stretch even to 
call this a “test.”153  To withstand rational basis scrutiny, the government 
 
150. See discussion supra Section I.B. 
151. As we delve into our discussion here of inscrutability, what the law requires, and 
what methods make algorithms more scrutable, it may be worthwhile to situate our use of the 
term “inscrutability” in the context of work by Andrew Selbst and Solon Barocas.  They dis-
tinguish between inscrutability—an inability to understand what the complex predictive rules 
that a machine-learning algorithm discovers are—and non-intuitiveness—an inability to un-
derstand how the input information that the algorithm considers are relevant to the outcome.  
See Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1085, 1091, 1094 (2018).  We use “inscrutability” largely as they do.  Also, we do not 
take up in depth non-intuitiveness because, as we discuss, an understanding of whether input 
features are intuitively relevant to the outcome—such as whether there is an intuitive causal 
relationship between them—is not at all required to justify administrative decisions.  Further-
more, as Selbst and Barocas rightly point out, causal inferences cannot be obtained from ma-
chine learning, and, even if causal relationships could be discovered, they are likely to be just 
as complex as correlational ones.  Id. at 1098.  But government does not need to establish 
causality to satisfy principles of reasoned transparency. 
152. See discussion supra Section II.C. 
153. See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text. 
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does not need to give a reason for its action; rather, the action simply must 
be one that is capable of being supported by a reason.154  When translated 
into a technical demand with respect to machine learning, substantive ra-
tionality will be satisfied by disclosing merely the outcome variable used in 
the machine-learning analysis and the objective function whose optimization 
yields predictions for the outcome.155  These two pieces of information will 
reveal the goal of the decisionmaking process and that it was indeed that very 
goal that the algorithm in fact attempted to achieve, which is all that is 
needed to satisfy the rational basis test.156 
2. Procedural Due Process 
The strictures of procedural due process, which apply when government 
makes individual adjudicatory decisions, are more demanding in that they 
necessitate that the government offer some statement of reasons.  Yet, as we 
explained in Part II, the Supreme Court has made clear that these reasons 
need not take the form of any formal opinion.157  Providing the outcome 
variable and objective function will form part of an adequate statement of 
reasons.  Procedural due process will also require that the government pro-
vide information about the accuracy of the algorithm in satisfying the gov-
ernment’s objective.  This is because procedural due process not only aims 
to ensure that the government treats individuals procedurally fairly, but also 
that government procedures are not prone to serious error.158  
 
154. See id. 
155. Note that this description applies more to adjudicating by algorithm than regulating 
by robot.  As mentioned earlier, it is only for adjudicating by algorithm that a single algorithm 
can accomplish the administrative goal.  When considering the more complex algorithms that 
presumably will be needed in most instances of regulating by robot, slightly different disclo-
sures would meet the demands of substantive due process.  There, the goal of the analytic 
system would be the criteria by which the “best” rule is defined and selected.  Mathematically, 
this is likely to be more complex than simply an outcome variable predicted and the objective 
function optimized to generate predictions, but the underlying point is the same: the only 
information that has to be revealed to meet substantive due process relates to the goal of the 
algorithm, not every detail of how it meets that goal.  
156. The federal district court in Texas discussed in Part III.A rejected a substantive due 
process claim even where the government relied on a “highly secretive” algorithm that was 
“impossible to replicate.”  Hous. Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 
251 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1180–83 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (rejecting plaintiffs’ arguments that school 
district’s reliance on secret algorithm violated their right to substantive due process and grant-
ing defendant’s motion for summary judgment).  
157. See id. 
158. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 346 n.29 (1976) (noting that “in order fully to 
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With machine learning, the procedural demand for error-correcting in-
formation can likely be met by the government disclosing three pieces of in-
formation.  First, the government should provide affected individuals chal-
lenging an algorithmic adjudication with the data—input variables—
collected about them to verify that they are accurate.159  
Second, the government should provide information about how accurate 
the algorithm is across individuals when evaluated in a test data set.  If an 
algorithm is predicting, for example, whether an individual is disabled, how 
often does the algorithm get such a prediction wrong?  Even if the algorithm 
is not using any incorrect input information, an algorithm that is simply bad 
at its job—that is, one that is unacceptably prone to error—could violate 
procedural due process.  That said, because machine learning is used pre-
cisely for its ability to make predictions with greater accuracy than other 
techniques and even humans, this is unlikely to be a barrier in practice.160  
Finally, the government should disclose the results from verification pro-
cedures that certify to individuals their adjudications were the outcome of 
algorithms being implemented correctly and without glitches.  In recent 
work, Joshua Kroll and his coauthors have outlined a series of verification 
methods, like cryptographic commitments and zero-knowledge proofs, that 
can ensure “procedural regularity”—namely, that algorithmic decisions 
“were made under an announced set of rules consistently applied in each 
case.”161  By using methods such as these, government officials can verify that 
predictions resulting from their algorithmic systems are working as in-
tended.162 
 
assess the reliability and fairness of a system of procedure, one must also consider the overall 
rate of error”); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972) (describing the purpose of due pro-
cess as extending beyond procedural fairness but including the desire “to minimize substan-
tively unfair or mistaken deprivations” of protected interests). 
159. This is similar to the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s reliance on revealing input infor-
mation as a way to correct potentially erroneous credit scoring.  Fair Credit Reporting Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018). 
160. See Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 10, at 1158 n.40 and accompanying text. 
161. Kroll et al., supra note 36, at 637. 
162. When the government relies on a physical rather than an algorithmic device—say, 
a thermometer—it would generally suffice to justify penalizing a person who failed to meet a 
temperature requirement (e.g., for storing food safely) that a thermometer measures temper-
ature levels accurately and that the specific use of that thermometer to show noncompliance 
followed proper techniques.  When comparable showings can be made for machine learning 
as for thermometers or other physical machines, there should be no question that they can 
satisfy the reason-giving demanded of the government under constitutional and statutory law.  
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Under prevailing principles of procedural due process, adjudication by al-
gorithm will likely satisfy legal requirements without much difficulty.163  The 
overarching framework for procedural due process analysis calls for a prag-
matic balancing of three factors: (1) the private interests at stake in a govern-
mental decision; (2) the “risk of an erroneous deprivation” of those interests 
from the decisionmaking process; and (3) the “fiscal and administrative bur-
dens” associated with a particular procedural arrangement.164  Of these three 
factors, the first will be obviously exogenous to machine learning, but the 
second two are undoubtedly affected by machine learning—and almost cer-
tainly for the better.  The appeal that machine learning holds for government 
agencies, after all, is precisely that it can facilitate more accurate, automated 
decisionmaking, resulting in both a reduction in the risk of errors as well as a 
savings in the time and expense of governmental decisionmaking.165  Agen-
cies that deploy machine learning in the adjudicatory context will obviously 
need to validate their use of algorithmic tools to demonstrate their ability to 
achieve these advantages, and they will need to afford individuals or entities 
subject to adjudication access to information to ensure that the algorithms 
were correctly applied.166  But nothing about machine learning’s inscrutabil-
ity should prevent agencies from making such demonstrations.  In the end, 
“recognizing that machine-learning algorithms have demonstrated superior-
ity over human decisions in other contexts, it is reasonable to conclude that 
agencies will be able to satisfy the demands of due process even in the ma-
chine-learning era.”167  
3. Arbitrary and Capricious Review 
Turning to what government agencies must show to satisfy the APA’s ar-
bitrary and capricious standard, we can see that here too agencies should be 
able to meet courts’ demand for reason-giving, notwithstanding the ostensi-
bly black-box nature of machine-learning algorithms.  It may be referred to 
 
Presumably any responsible agency using a machine-learning algorithm would be able to jus-
tify that use by explaining an algorithm’s objective function, releasing data used in the indi-
vidual case, and disclosing the results of validation tests. 
163. Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 10, at 1184–91. 
164. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see also Schweiker v. McClure, 456 
U.S. 188, 200 (1982) (“Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the 
particular situation demands.”). 
165. Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 10, at 1185–86. 
166. See id. at 1186–91 (discussing validation and “cross-examination” of adjudicatory 
algorithms). 
167. Id. at 1191. 
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as “hard look” review, but the arbitrary and capricious standard has never 
required a full explanation of the kind that psychologists, historians, or polit-
ical scientists might demand if they wanted to understand exactly why gov-
ernment officials reached a decision.168  If the courts have no need to peer 
into the minds of government administrators,169 they presumably should 
have little worry that they cannot peer into the “minds” of machine-learning 
algorithms either.   
Arbitrary and capricious review applies to any agency action, but it is es-
pecially salient in the context of judicial review of rulemaking.  What will 
matter to the courts is that the agency has sufficiently justified its design of 
and reliance on a particular algorithmic tool.  The agency will need to reveal 
and justify its choice of an outcome variable and objective function.  As the 
selection of an objective function and design of an algorithm necessarily en-
tail making tradeoffs that call for policy judgment,170 an agency will need to 
explain its choices about these tradeoffs in terms of factors that are consistent 
with the agency’s statutory authority, and it will need to respond to mean-
ingful public comments submitted during a rulemaking.171  Agencies will also 
need to validate that the algorithm performs as intended and that it achieves 
the justified objectives.  The courts will scrutinize agencies’ reasoning about 
these choices and their validation efforts, but, in the end, the legal test is sup-
posed to be “whether there has been a clear error of judgment” in designing 
and validating an algorithm to achieve a valid purpose—not whether the 
specific results of a machine-learning algorithm will be intuitively explaina-
ble.172  
 
168. See supra notes 108–109 and accompanying text; see also Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 
F.2d 1, 97–98 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (explaining that although the courts should educate themselves 
about the evidence the agency considered in making its decision, in the final analysis, a judge 
is to “look at the decision not as the chemist, biologist or statistician that [they] are qualified 
neither by training nor experience to be, but as a reviewing court exercising [their] narrowly 
defined duty of holding agencies to certain minimal standards of rationality”). 
169. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
170. See, e.g., Richard Berk et al., Fairness in Criminal Justice Risk Assessments: The State 
of the Art (May 30, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Cornell University Library), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1703.09207.pdf. 
171. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (explaining 
that “the court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the rele-
vant factors”); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983) (describing as arbitrary and capricious an agency decision “so implausible that it could 
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise”). 
172. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416. 
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Federal courts have long demonstrated a tendency to defer to administra-
tive agencies’ judgments in cases involving complex mathematical modeling 
and scientific analysis.173  Although the arbitrary and capricious test calls for 
judges to ensure that agencies have carefully considered relevant factors, the 
Supreme Court has also indicated that, when a government decision “‘re-
quires a high degree of technical expertise,’ we must defer to ‘the informed 
discretion of the responsible agencies.’”174  Designing and validating a ma-
chine-learning algorithm will certainly require a high level of technical ex-
pertise.  Furthermore, as the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted, when 
a governmental action “involves a great deal of predictive judgment,” these 
“judgments are entitled to particularly deferential review.”175  Enhancing the 
government’s ability to make predictive judgments constitutes the main pur-
pose of designing and validating machine-learning algorithms, so we should 
expect that judicial deference would be afforded in cases where agencies rely 
on algorithmic governance.176 
 
173. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43; Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 462 
U.S. 87, 103 (1983). 
174. Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371 (2011) (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra 
Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412 (1976)). 
175. Trout Unlimited v. Lohn, 559 F.3d 946, 959 (9th Cir. 2009). 
176. We acknowledge that, in the past, courts have deferred to human decisionmaking 
by expert agencies, whereas arguably such deference might be less suited to decisions made 
by outcome-determinative algorithmic systems, especially in cases of rules generated by auto-
mated rulemaking systems.  We grant that some aspects of current law could well impose 
certain impediments if agencies rely on automated rulemaking by robot.  For example, an 
agency would need to demonstrate “good cause” if the use of such a system were to bypass 
the normal notice-and-comment process.  See supra note 88.  Yet, for purposes of arbitrary and 
capricious review, we see no fundamental impediment when the agency is able to justify ade-
quately the way it has designed and operated its algorithmic system.  An algorithmic system 
is simply a tool selected by the agency to aid agency officials in fulfilling their statutory respon-
sibilities.  Even when that tool is an automated rulemaking system, such a system can only be 
designed in such a manner that comports with human policy and design choices embedded 
within it.  Cf. Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 10, at 1180–84.  The agency rule will simply be 
one that has nested within it the possibility for a series of subsidiary, automated rule “deci-
sions” made contingent on algorithmic predictions.  Granted, the agency rule will thus be 
much more complicated than otherwise, but conceptually, it will not be fundamentally differ-
ent than when an agency embeds within its rules other contingencies or requires the use of 
other tools to measure those contingencies.  Just as with the selection of any other tool (e.g., 
an air quality monitoring device or even a thermometer), agencies will need to justify their 
choices, but when these choices call for technical expertise, as they necessarily will with ma-
chine learning, the applicable legal standard remains a deferential one. 
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The district court’s reasoning in Alaska v. Lubchenco177 is instructive.  Alt-
hough that case involved traditional statistical techniques, the court never-
theless confronted charges that the agency failed to provide adequate reasons 
to support its forecasting analysis.178  That analysis predicted a sustained de-
cline in the population of beluga whales in the Cook Inlet of Alaska.179  On 
the basis of this forecast, the National Marine Fisheries Service (the Service) 
designated the whale population in Alaska as an endangered species and 
therefore subjected Alaska to a whaling ban.180  The state of Alaska chal-
lenged the Service’s decision in federal court in Washington, D.C.  The court 
reviewed the agency’s decision under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious 
standard—but also against an additional requirement contained in the En-
dangered Species Act (ESA) that the Service make its determinations “solely 
on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data available.”181  
The court described in some detail the nature of the statistical model the 
Service used “to determine the probability of extinction” that then consti-
tuted the agency’s reason for declaring the beluga whale to be endangered:182  
The Service performed extensive testing on the model’s sensitivity to these variables by 
running more than ten thousand individual trials for further analysis.  Using statistical 
methods, the Service then compared models with these different effects to the observed 
population trend from 1994 to 2008 in order to determine which model best matched 
the existing data.  The model was also peer-reviewed by independent scientists, 
including researchers from Alaska’s own Department of Fish and Game.  On the basis 
of this sensitivity analysis, the Service selected a model that most closely fit the observed 
population trends.  The “most realistic” model predicted a 1 percent risk of extinction 
in 50 years, a 26 percent risk of extinction in 100 years, and a 70 percent risk of 
extinction in 300 years.  But even under the “base case scenario” or “healthy 
population” model, there was 29 percent risk of extinction in 300 years.  As a measure 
of confidence in this negative trend, the model estimated that there is only a 5 percent 
probability that the population growth rate is above 2 percent, while there is at least a 
62 percent probability that the population will decline further.183 
Alaska claimed that the Service’s “population model was arbitrarily chosen 
from among the thousands of trial runs produced by the Service’s population 
 
177. 825 F. Supp. 2d 209 (D.D.C. 2011). 
178. See id. at 213 (describing the modeling technique as a time-series econometric 
model). 
179. See id. (explaining the results of the National Marine Fisheries Service’s (the Ser-
vice’s) time-series model). 
180. Id. at 212. 
181. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2018). 
182. Lubchenco, 825 F. Supp. 2d at 221. 
183. Id. 
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viability analysis” and “that the Service gave no explanation for relying on 
one model—the ‘most realistic’ one—out of the thirty-one possible models 
that could result from mixing and matching the independent variables.”184  
The court rejected Alaska’s arguments, concluding that the Service had 
satisfied the relevant legal tests for reason-giving.  The court observed that: 
There is no “better” way to assess a species’ likelihood of extinction.  Plaintiffs do not 
suggest a more accurate method for estimating the abundance of marine mammals, 
nor do they point to a superior method of projecting the observed population trend into 
the future.  “If no one propose[s] anything better, then what is available is the best.”185 
Of course, today or in the near future, the use of machine-learning algo-
rithms might well provide that better, or more accurate, way to predict spe-
cies extinction.186   
It is telling that the court’s assessment of the agency’s analysis depended 
on factors that could easily be met if agencies rely on inscrutable machine-
learning algorithms: process (e.g., peer review) and predictive performance 
(i.e., accuracy).  The court did not delve into the inner workings of the statis-
tical models or ask why the models performed well.  It did not demand any 
replication or even the submission of the underlying data to the court.  Ulti-
mately, the court rejected Alaska’s arguments entirely on pragmatic grounds: 
The most important thing to remember is that even if plaintiffs can poke some holes in 
the agency’s models, that does not necessarily preclude a conclusion that these models 
are the best available science.  Some degree of predictive error is inherent in the nature 
of mathematical modeling.  The standard under the ESA is that “the Service must 
utilize the ‘best scientific . . . data available,’ not the best scientific data possible.”  In 
this case, plaintiffs do not point to any superior data that the Service should have 
considered.  And the State’s own peer reviewer concluded that although the model 
assumptions “could have been more detailed” or “better discussed,” “the assumptions 
made considering what is known about beluga biology and life history were 
reasonable.”  Thus, it ultimately makes no difference that plaintiffs can point to a few 
shortcomings here and there in the Service’s modeling.  The agency’s population via-  
 
184. Id. at 223. 
185. Id. at 221 (quoting Massachusetts ex rel. Div. of Marine Fisheries v. Daley, 170 F.3d 
23, 30 (1st Cir. 1999)). 
186. See, e.g., Morteza Mashayekhi et al., A Machine Learning Approach to Investigate the Reasons 
Behind Species Extinction, 20 ECOLOGICAL INFORMATICS 58, 66 (2014) (arguing that a machine 
learning approach to species population analysis “may prove to be beneficial for conservation 
biologists from the point of view of being able to detect early signals of extinction”); Julian D. 
Olden et al., Machine Learning Methods Without Tears: A Primer for Ecologists, 83 Q. REV. BIOL. 
171, 172 (2008) (noting that “a number of [machine learning] techniques have been promoted 
in ecology as powerful alternatives to traditional modeling approaches”). 
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bility analysis represents the best available science and is therefore entitled to 
deference.187 
Even if Alaska had claimed that another statistical approach would have 
been superior, the court still probably would have deferred to the agency.  
When litigation turns into a “‘battle of the experts’ . . . the courts tradition-
ally reject” the challenger’s claims and declare the agency the winner.188 
The district court’s approach in Alaska v. Lubchenco is emblematic of courts’ 
more general deferential posture toward agency reason-giving under the 
APA.  Although many courts will scrutinize agencies’ reasoning, even when 
it is based on mathematical or other technical analysis, it is the outlier court 
that demands much more than the Lubchenco court.189  In most cases, it will 
likely be enough for government officials to satisfy the arbitrary and capri-
cious test if they can show that (a) an algorithmic system was constructed to 
advance a legally valid purpose by revealing the goal of an algorithm, (b) it is 
functioning correctly to advance that purpose (i.e., the program is not mal-
functioning and it is producing validated results), and (c) it is being used as 
intended.190  Demanding much more would go far beyond any notion of rea-
son-giving demanded of government officials today.  
4. Reasoned Transparency Under Conditions of Limited Fishbowl Transparency 
Up to this point, we have proceeded under an assumption of full disclosure 
about all elements of an algorithmic system.  Doing so has allowed us to show 
that, at least in principle, the ostensibly black-box nature of machine-learning 
algorithms should not by itself impede agencies from providing entirely suf-
ficient explanations that will meet the tests of due process or arbitrary and 
capricious review.  The remaining question now is whether government can 
meet these tests with anything less than a best-case assumption of total fish-
bowl transparency.  
This question arises in practice because the law does not demand total 
fishbowl transparency and, in many cases, total transparency will not be able 
to be provided for justifiable reasons.191  But in most cases, all the information 
 
187. Lubchenco, 825 F. Supp. 2d at 223. 
188. McGarity & Wagner, supra note 109, at 10,769. 
189. See id. at 10,759 (noting “several outlier cases . . . evincing very little deference to 
agencies”). 
190. Courts may even accept less, such as by failing to insist on validation efforts.  See id. 
at 10,768 (noting that “an agency’s decision to forego the validation or calibration of models 
is usually, but not always, respected by the courts”). 
191. See Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)–(9) (2018) (identifying nine 
major exemptions from FOIA disclosure). 
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that must be disclosed to satisfy legal demands of reasoned transparency will 
be able to be disclosed.  Admittedly, as in the Wisconsin and Texas legal 
actions, which challenged algorithms developed by private firms,192 when-
ever government relies on contractors to develop algorithms, some of the 
contractors’ information, such as the underlying source code, may well be 
subject to protection as a trade secret or confidential business information.193  
But for several reasons, even trade secret protection is unlikely to constitute 
a major limiting factor in most cases.  First, the objective functions and out-
come variables that should be disclosed will likely not be properly classified 
as trade secrets because they represent the government’s goal; the mathematical 
form of the objective function will often be dictated, or created, by the gov-
ernment, not by the private party.194  Second, other essential elements of rea-
son-giving—such as results from testing and validation procedures, and the 
claimants’ own data to ensure accuracy—will in most cases be fully releasable 
 
192. As noted earlier, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the challenged use of an 
algorithmic risk assessment on procedural due process grounds because the appellant had ac-
cess to sufficient non-proprietary information.  State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 753–54 
(Wis. 2016).  The federal district court in Texas, on the other hand, held that the proprietary 
nature of the algorithm, in that case at least, raised a question for a jury as to whether the 
plaintiffs had available enough information to satisfy demands of procedural due process.  
Hous. Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1175 
(S.D. Tex. 2017). 
193. See generally Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the 
Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (2018) (discussing how the trade secret status of 
algorithmic components may affect criminal proceedings). 
194. To be clear, there may certainly be instances in which an objective function does 
contain information that could be considered a trade secret and that goes beyond revealing 
merely the predictive goal of the algorithm.  Particularly, “regularization” methods used to 
prevent overfitting to, in very rough and broad terms, push the algorithm to make predictions 
in particular ways can involve adding additional mathematical terms to the objective function.  
In other words, the objective function may contain more than simply an indication of how it 
is assessing “accuracy,” such as by reference to residuals or errors.  Cf. Lehr & Ohm, supra 
note 2, at 704–05 (discussing the use of regularization to reduce an algorithm’s disparate im-
pacts).  The mathematical additions to objective functions could perhaps be deemed trade 
secrets if they were developed by private companies.  But this is unlikely to be problematic for 
two reasons.  First, those additions could always be excerpted before disclosure, leaving only 
the non-confidential parts of the objective function to be disclosed; this would still indicate 
whether the goal pursued by the algorithm is legitimate—the purpose of disclosing the objec-
tive function in the first place.  Second, as we discuss, in camera review is always an option. 
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without needing to divulge any protected source code or other trade se-
crets.195  Third, even if the proprietary nature of a private contractor’s un-
derlying source code does bar the government from disclosing necessary in-
formation, that information can always be reviewed by a court in camera, 
thus protecting any trade secrets or confidential business information.  In the 
rulemaking context, independent peer reviews could be conducted under 
non-disclosure agreements.  Finally, as noted in Section III.A, agencies could 
proactively work to avoid any conflict between trade secret protection and 
reasoned transparency simply by drafting contracts with their private con-
sultants to clarify what information must be treated confidentially and what 
information may be disclosed.196  
In most instances, we would expect the fishbowl transparency issues to be 
worked out without much difficulty because of the pragmatic nature of trans-
parency law’s demands.  We note as well that we have been assuming all 
along that the agency will be using machine-learning systems in outcome-
determinative ways.  Where this is not the case, the agency will presumably 
be able to provide an alternative explanation that does not require the dis-
closure of any confidential information.  The important takeaway is that in 
most cases the demands of reasoned transparency will be able to be met while 
still respecting authorized limitations on fishbowl transparency.197 
C. Technical Advances in Algorithmic Transparency 
The previous Section showed that meeting the demands of reasoned trans-
parency, even under circumstances of limited fishbowl transparency, should 
not be difficult for responsible government officials to meet.  This alone 
 
195. Furthermore, as Joshua Kroll and his coauthors have pointed out, the source code 
may not reveal anything more about the functioning of a machine-learning algorithm.  See 
Kroll et al., supra note 36, at 638. 
196. See supra notes 120–137 and accompanying text. 
197. Our focus throughout this article is on federal transparency law in the United States 
as it applies to the actions of government agencies.  We note that, at a more general level, the 
analysis we provide here might accord with how the EU’s “right to explanation” may eventu-
ally be understood under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).  See generally EU 
General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 9.  At least one early assessment suggests that 
private organizations using machine learning may simply need to provide “a basic explanation 
of how the model is working” to satisfy the GDPR’s requirement of “meaningful information” 
about the “logic” and “significance” of the automated algorithmic system.  Andrew Burt, Is 
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should assuage any concern that fundamental principles of transparency en-
shrined in law might be threatened by governmental use of so-called “black 
box” algorithms.  But we now take our analysis one step further, showing 
how machine-learning analyses are growing less inscrutable due to technical 
advances.  Over the last few years, there has been expanding interest—
among members of both the legal and technical communities—in improving 
the interpretability of algorithms in ways that go well beyond what is legally 
demanded.198  Research is accumulating that details technical methods for 
improving the ability to explain the inner workings of machine learning in 
more intuitive ways.199  For the reasons we have discussed above, these tech-
nical developments are not essential for satisfying the legal requirement of 
 
198. To the extent that legal considerations have helped motivate some of this interest, 
we suspect that a driving force has been the EU’s GDPR with its ambiguous right to explana-
tion.  See generally EU General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 9, § 71.  The GDPR 
applies to private-sector uses of machine learning, and uncertainty over what counts as a suf-
ficient explanation for purposes of the new EU regulation presumably has produced signifi-
cant enough stakes to attract the attention of both researchers and market actors.  Of course, 
researchers have long attempted to get reasons, of sorts, out of machine-learning algorithms.  
Indeed, some of the basic methods that we describe in this section were developed earlier in 
the 2000s.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. BERK, STATISTICAL LEARNING FROM A REGRESSION 
PERSPECTIVE 226–29, 277–92 (1st ed. 2008) (describing partial dependence plots).  But these 
early methods are limited in two ways.  First, as a technical matter, they are limited in applica-
bility; as we will discuss, for some particularly advanced machine-learning techniques in use 
today, analogues to these basic methods either have not yet been developed or have been 
developed only more recently.  Second, these methods do not serve the same purpose, and 
were not developed in response to the same pressures, as the cutting-edge techniques we dis-
cuss later in this Section.  Some early machine-learning methods, like random forests, were 
initially applied to social science problems, and it is social scientists’ objective to attempt to 
model phenomena.  As a result, the goal of many reason-giving methods was to give social 
scientists tools for telling descriptive stories about what processes could be generating the data 
they observed.  That goal contrasts with the goal motivating development of many cutting-
edge techniques we discuss later—reducing the opacity of algorithms whose applications in 
sensitive contexts mandates a certain level of reason-giving.  This goal emerged from a host of 
primarily legal and policy scholars who critiqued applications of machine learning for being 
too opaque.  See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 2, at 658–64.  This concern has in turn sparked 
innovation from technical scholars, often working in tandem with the legal scholars.  See, e.g., 
ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (ACM FAT), ACM FAT* CONF., 
https://fatconference.org/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2019); Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency 
in Machine Learning, FAT/ML, http://www.fatml.org/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2019). 
199. See Andrew D. Selbst, A Mild Defense of Our New Machine Overlords, 70 VAND. L. REV. 
EN BANC 87 (“Black boxes can generally be tested, and the relationship between inputs and 
outputs is often knowable, even if one cannot describe succinctly how all potential inputs map 
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reasoned transparency; however, their emergence reinforces optimism that 
algorithmic governance methods can be deployed in ways that are suffi-
ciently transparent, both to satisfy existing legal demands as well as to fulfill 
potentially broader aspirations of good government. 
Our concern with transparency here centers on humans’ analytic ability 
to understand how an algorithm’s internal processes ostensibly produce pre-
dictions.  This contrasts with understanding whether those processes are in 
fact what are producing the predictions—that is, information that verifies its 
functioning.  The former describes how the internal math of an algorithm 
operates to yield predictions, while the latter—verification—refers to issues 
already discussed in Section III.B concerning whether it is indeed that math 
that yields predictions instead of computer glitches or faulty programming.  
To explain what reason-giving methods exist and how they elucidate al-
gorithmic functioning, let us return to an example we first presented in Sec-
tion I.A of an algorithm hypothetically deployed by the FAA to determine 
pilot certification.  Suppose that a candidate pilot was predicted to be unwor-
thy of certification.  What kinds of reasons could be given for why the pilot 
was so predicted?  We can distinguish between the reasons about an algo-
rithm’s operations at an individual level and at a group level.200  The former 
refers to being able to understand why a particular prediction or estimation 
resulted.  In this case, an individual-level explanation would provide under-
standing of what aspects about the specific candidate led to the prediction in 
 
to outputs.  To say that something is a black box is not to say we can understand nothing 
about it.”)  Note that the methods we discuss in this Section are what Selbst and Barocas would 
refer to in their work as post hoc methods—those that do not place any constraints on how 
the algorithm is initially specified.  See Selbst & Barocas, supra note 151, at 34–35.  By contrast, 
they also contemplate opportunities to increase the scrutability of algorithms by restricting the 
algorithm’s complexity—by, for example, limiting the number of input variables or choosing 
(and appropriately tuning) algorithms that are, by their nature, less complex than others.  We 
do not address these because, as we mention at the outset, many analysts as well as government 
officials will properly welcome complexity; it is this complexity that enables machine learning’s 
prowess.  Furthermore, given our discussion of the level of reasoned transparency necessitated 
by the law, administrative uses of machine learning should face no significant legal demands 
to be less complex.  If anything, the courts have indicated that they will give greater deference 
to agencies under the Administrative Procedure Act when issues are complex.  See Motor Ve-
hicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); Balt. Gas & Elec. 
Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983). 
200. Individual-level explanations are also sometimes referred to in the technical litera-
ture as local explanations, and group-level explanations are referred to as global explanations.  
See, e.g., Riccardo Guidotti et al., A Survey of Methods for Explaining Black Box Models, 105 ACM 
COMPUTING SURVS. 93:1, 93:6 (2018). 
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his case.  A group-level explanation, on the other hand, does not try to reveal 
why a particular entity’s prediction resulted; rather, it reveals patterns or 
trends in the factors affecting predictions across entities.  It might reveal, say, 
what features of pilots tend to lead to predictions of flight worthiness (or non-
worthiness) across all pilots examined by the algorithm. 
Within both individual- and group-level explanations, we can also distin-
guish between methods explaining the importance of input variables and 
those explaining the functional forms of input variables.201  The former at-
tempts to reveal, roughly speaking, the magnitude of the effect of a given 
input variable—say, the applicant’s age—on the ability of the algorithm to 
make successful forecasts.  A method aimed at explaining importance will 
essentially seek to measure how much that variable matters relative either to 
that variable not being considered at all by the algorithm (i.e., the algorithm 
dropping age from the analysis) or to having the values the variable takes on 
randomized (i.e., stripping the age variable of any predictively useful infor-
mation it may contain).202  When implemented on a group level, measures of 
importance are often interpreted as reductions in overall accuracy across all 
individuals examined—for example, if the variable about the applicant’s age 
were removed from consideration or randomly shuffled, the algorithm would 
make a certain percentage more errors across all candidates when predicting 
that they are not worthy of certification.203  Technical methods for achieving 
this kind of group-level meaning about variable importance have existed for 
a while for less complex machine-learning algorithms, but have recently 
started to be developed or refined for more complex ones.204  
When importance methods are implemented on an individual level, they 
take on a slightly different interpretation.  Because they do not operate across 
multiple individuals, they cannot be interpreted as percentage reductions in 
accuracy when a variable is dropped or randomly shuffled.  Rather, they are 
often interpreted as indicating how “pivotal” an input variable is to an indi-
vidual’s prediction.  In other words, they indicate how likely it is that, if an 
 
201. In the regression literature, input variables are also referred to as independent vari-
ables, while output variables are referred to as dependent variables. 
202. See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 2, at 679–81. 
203. See id. 
204. See, e.g., Anupam Datta et al., Algorithmic Transparency via Quantitative Input Influence: 
Theory and Experiments with Learning Systems, 2016 IEEE SYMP. ON SECURITY & PRIVACY 598, 
601, 608-09; Marina M.-C. Vidovic et al., Feature Importance Measure for Non-Linear 
Learning Algorithms (Nov. 22, 2016) (unpublished conference paper) (on file with Cornell 
University Library), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1611.07567.pdf (analyzing different methods for 
teaching complex machine-learning algorithms). 
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input variable, like the age of the candidate, were dropped or randomly shuf-
fled, a candidate’s predicted flight worthiness would change.  If dropping that 
variable or randomly shuffling its value has no effect on a candidate’s ulti-
mate prediction, then one could say that the variable is not “important” or 
“pivotal.”  Analytic methods that accomplish this kind of individual-level ex-
planation of importance are actively being developed.205 
In addition to methods aimed at explaining the importance of an input 
variable, technical methods are being refined to explain input variables’ func-
tional forms, adding a different kind of meaning.  The importance methods 
discussed above do not give any indication of the direction or manner in 
which the input variable about an applicant’s age affects the predicted out-
come; they do not say, for instance, that an increase in a pilot’s age tends to 
be associated with an increase in the predicted outcome variable (or a higher 
probability, if the outcome variable is a binary prediction).  That is what 
methods explaining functional forms attempt to explain.206  To explain func-
tional form, however, these methods produce, as a practical matter, a differ-
ent form of output.  The importance of an input variable can be indicated by 
a number indicating, say, the percent increase in error (for a group-level ex-
planation) or the probability of a different prediction (for an individual-level 
explanation).  By contrast, the functional form of a variable is often revealed 
on a graphical plot.  Such plots indicate, roughly speaking, the effect that 
increases or decreases in a given input variable, like the applicant’s age, have 
on the outcome variable, holding the values of all other input variables con-
stant.  Notably, unlike importance measures, explanations of functional 
forms are available only on the group level, not the individual level.  Further-
more, while group-level explanations of functional form have been available 
for some time for less complex machine-learning methods, they have only 
started to be developed for more complex algorithms, like various forms of 
deep learning.207 
 
205. See, e.g., Grégoire Montavon et al., Explaining NonLinear Classification Decisions with Deep 
Taylor Decomposition, 65 PATTERN RECOGNITION 211 (2017) (focusing data analysis on individ-
ual data points); Wojciech Samek et al., Explainable Artificial Intelligence: Understanding, Visualizing 
and Interpreting Deep Learning Models, ITU J., Oct. 2017 (analyzing individual predictions in ma-
chine leaning and artificial intelligence); Wojciech Samek et al., Interpreting the Predictions of Com-
plex ML Models by Layer-wise Relevance Propagation, in 9887 LNCS: ARTIFICIAL NEURAL 
NETWORKS AND MACHINE LEARNING – ICANN 2016 (Alessandro E.P. Villa, Paolo Masulli,  
and Antonio Javier Pons Rivero, eds., 2016) (summarizing a technique that explains predic-
tions in machine learning); Vidovic et al., supra note 204. 
206. See Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 10, at 1212; Lehr & Ohm, supra note 2, at 709–
10. 
207. See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 2, at 709–10; see, e.g., Marco Tulio Ribeiro et al., Model-
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In our example, a group-level explanation of importance might reveal to 
the candidate that, if an input variable indicating the applicant’s age were 
omitted from the algorithm, the algorithm would make thirty percent more 
errors across individuals when predicting that candidates are not worthy of 
certification.  Taken alone, and despite it being a group-level explanation, 
this could suggest to the candidate that she was predicted as not being flight-
worthy because of her age.  But an individual-level explanation of im-
portance could reveal a contradictory story.  It might reveal, for instance, 
that when the relevant input variables were randomly shuffled, there was 
only a five percent chance of the particular candidate’s negative prediction 
changing.  In other words, the candidate’s age probably did not have a bear-
ing on her ultimate prediction.  It should be clear that, in such a circum-
stance, the individual-level explanation will typically be of far greater value 
for understanding how the algorithm functioned.  
Turning to an explanation of functional form, suppose that the individual-
level explanation of importance indicated that the age variable was im-
portant to the candidate’s negative prediction.  That alone does not reveal 
how the candidate’s age affected her outcome—just that it did.  A group-
level plot of functional form could elucidate this.  It could reveal that, holding 
all other things constant, pilots who are older are more likely to be deemed 
worthy of certification.  If the candidate were younger, this group-level ex-
planation could suggest that the applicant’s denial was negatively affected by 
her age.  But, of course, this may not necessarily be true because this is a 
group-level explanation.  It could have been the case that, for this particular 
candidate’s prediction, given other attributes about her, the algorithm actu-
ally found that the younger age made her more worthy of certification.  
Admittedly, there is much work still underway in designing, using, and 
understanding machine-learning algorithms.  Much work that has been com-
pleted to date on importance and functional form has yet to undergo rigorous 
testing or evaluation by the statistical community.  But the rapid pace at 
which these methods are being refined in response to growing interest in al-
gorithmic transparency provides a basis for even greater optimism for the 
future reliance on algorithmic governance.  The sophistication and refine-
ment of these methods will only continue to grow, and they are already suf-
ficiently developed to support confidence in the explainability of machine-
learning algorithms.  Even when algorithms are applied to make individual-
level predictions—often, at least at first blush, some of the most visceral of  
  
 
Agnostic Interpretability of Machine Learning (Jun. 16, 2016) (unpublished conference paper) 
(on file with Cornell University Library), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1606.05386.pdf (arguing for 
explaining machine learning predictions using model-agnostic approaches). 
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applications, such as predictive policing—government agencies will likely 
have strategies available to them to provide rather detailed individual-level 
explanations. 
CONCLUSION 
If machine-learning applications are designed and managed well, govern-
mental reliance on them should be able to withstand legal challenges based 
on principles of reason-giving.  The fact that the use of such algorithms can 
satisfy legal demands for transparency does not mean that algorithms should 
immediately be deployed in any particularly administrative domain.  But it 
does mean that scholars, policymakers, and the public ought to be receptive 
to the use of machine-learning algorithms where they can improve public 
administration.  The responsible use of algorithms—even in outcome-deter-
minative ways—will not contravene legal principles of transparency.  Alt-
hough the potential for outcome-determinative uses of machine learning by 
governments loom on the horizon, algorithms will likely be applied more of-
ten to assist, rather than supplant, human judgment.  If, as we have shown, 
even outcome-determinative applications of machine learning can meet the 
law’s demands, then there should be even less concern over the less determi-
native uses. 
Of course, there is always something to be said for promoting transpar-
ency even beyond what agencies must do to withstand judicial scrutiny of 
their reasoning.208  After all, to have trust and confidence in their govern-
ment, citizens may well hold more demanding expectations for meaningful 
information than do the courts.  We are thus heartened that data scientists 
are already finding ways to do more than is required to coax explanatory 
information out of ostensibly black-box algorithms.  We are not only confi-
dent that governments will be able to meet demands for explainability in 
their use of algorithms, especially under prevailing legal standards, but we 
are cautiously optimistic that algorithmic governance might in important cir-
cumstances even enhance public trust and legitimacy in government.  In 
some cases, well-designed algorithms may increase public trust by achieving 
 
208. See CARY COGLIANESE, LISTENING, LEARNING, LEADING: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
REGULATORY EXCELLENCE 5–6 (2015).  We have emphasized the transparency of algorithms 
in this Article because it is a critically important consideration in a decision to use them in 
public-sector applications.  But it is certainly not the only consideration.  Algorithmic govern-
ance also implicates other values—fairness, equality, privacy, efficiency—that should be con-
sidered on a case-by-case basis when officials contemplate a move to machine learning.  
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faster and fairer outcomes for those individuals who interact with govern-
ment agencies and are subject to their decisions.209 
In the future, a government that makes use of so-called black-box algo-
rithms need not be a black-box government.  With responsible practices, 
government officials can take advantage of machine learning’s predictive 
prowess while remaining faithful to principles of open government.  Algo-
rithmic governance can meet the law’s demands for transparency while still 
enhancing efficacy, efficiency, and even legitimacy in government.  
 
 
209. Earlier we noted that eBay has had a successful experience in relying on an auto-
mated dispute resolution process to settle tens of millions of disputes each year.  Strikingly, 
eBay has found that “parties who engaged in the process were more likely to return and pur-
chase other items through eBay, a pretty remarkable result from settling a dispute.”  BARTON 
& BIBAS, supra note 27, at 113. 
